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Abstract
We analyze optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions
on their valuations, and bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash. With sufficient
valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs, the optimal mechanism features asym-
metry so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different (ex-ante) probabilities.
When bidders are ex-ante identical, higher royalty rates—which tie payments more
closely to bidder valuations—increase the optimal degree of asymmetry in auction de-
sign, further raising revenues. When bidders differ ex-ante in entry costs, the seller
favors the low cost entrant; whereas when bidders have different valuation distribu-
tions, the seller favors the weaker bidder if entry costs are low, but not if they are high.
Higher royalty rates cause the seller to favor the weaker bidder by less, and the strong
bidder by more.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the optimal design of auctions when bidders base costly entry deci-
sions on their valuations, and bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash. Such auctions
are common: Skrzypacz (2013) reports oil and gas lease auctions typically feature equity
payments in the form of royalties; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) report that 70%
of mergers and acquisitions involve some equity; and, as Gorbenko and Malenko (2011)
and Skrzypacz (2013) highlight, venture capital financing, procurement auctions, and lead-
plaintiff auctions often use similar payment structures.
We establish that as long as there is sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs,
the optimal mechanism features asymmetry so that bidders enter with strictly positive but
different (ex-ante) probabilities. When bidders are ex-ante identical, higher royalty rates—
which tie payments more closely to bidder types—increase the optimal degree of asymmetry
in auction design, allowing the seller to raise revenues further. When bidders differ ex ante,
strategic interactions become more subtle. We show that the optimal bidder to favor, the
extent of such favoritism, and the impact of the royalty rate hinge on the nature of the het-
erogeneity and the size of entry costs. We provide a unified intuition for the driving forces
underlying these findings.
In our setting, bidders have independent and private valuations for the asset, and know
their valuations before incurring entry costs, as in Samuelson (1985) or Sogo, Bernhardt,
and Liu (2016).1 To highlight the basic insights and tradeoffs, we first examine a scenario
with ex-ante identical bidders and symmetric equilibria. Paying for entry is costly and du-
plicative: the entry costs of all bidders save the winner are wasted. The optimal mechanism
trades off between the increased rents that more entrants can bring versus the higher total
entry costs incurred by more bidders. If valuation uncertainty for bidders is modest, so are
the welfare gains from greater selection, but the probability that the asset goes unsold rises
with the number of potential bidders. We provide sufficient conditions under which a seller
should restrict entry to a single bidder, setting a take-it-or-leave-it price.2
1In the appendix we analyze auction designs when bidders only learn their valuations after after entering.
2This result is consistent with Gentry and Stroup (2019). Their estimates reveal that the relative
performance of auctions over negotiations for corporate takeovers is higher when uncertainty about target
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More typically, uncertainty over bidder valuations is more extensive relative to entry costs.
In such a setting with two bidders, we identify mild conditions under which asymmetric auc-
tions that favor one bidder over the other are optimal, so that bidders enter with strictly pos-
itive but different ex-ante probabilities. The intuition underlying the tradeoffs of introducing
asymmetric entry thresholds is simple and, as we shall show, robust. Consider a small spread
away from a symmetric mechanism with entry thresholds where each bidder enters with prob-
ability p ∈ (0, 1) to an asymmetric mechanism in which one bidder enters with probability
p+∆p and the other enters with probability p−∆p. Introducing this asymmetry reduces the
probability of no sale from (1− p)2 to (1− p)2 − (∆p)2, while leaving total expected entry
costs unchanged. However, it forsakes choice when the higher valuation bidder is excluded.
The optimal design balances these gains and costs. To encourage entry by a bidder with
a low valuation, the seller sets a higher reserve for the other bidder. This preserves a high
probability of trade, while obtaining efficient allocations when the handicapped bidder has a
high valuation. Due to the rival’s handicap, the bidder facing a low reserve is willing to enter
even with a low valuation, understanding that the probability of competition is not so high.
Higher royalty rates increase the degree of asymmetry in the optimal design. This reflects
that spreading entry thresholds raises total bidder profits at a seller’s expense. However,
higher royalty rates offset this by reducing bidder profit in the optimal design (reflecting the
Demarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (hereafter DKS, 2005) logic that steeper securities enhance
seller revenues). Higher royalty rates differentially reduce the profit of a bidder who faces
a lower reserve when its valuation is high. Thus, they reduce the value attached by a seller
to competition by another bidder, making it optimal to set a higher reserve for that bidder,
increasing the asymmetry.3 Higher royalty rates increase seller profit for a given degree of
asymmetry, and when the degree is set optimally, seller revenues are further enhanced.
To reinforce how higher royalty rates increase the optimal degree of asymmetry we allow
values is extensive.
3The asymmetry refers to direct-mechanisms. In the analogous costless entry setting, Myerson (1981)
shows the optimal direct-mechanism is necessarily symmetric when bidders are ex-ante identical. Deb and
Pai (2017) show in a no entry cost setting that if one maintains interim individual rationality, but relaxes
ex-post individual rationality so that a winning bidder can pay more than the asset’s expected value, then
an asymmetric direct-mechanism can almost always be implemented via a symmetric indirect-mechanism
in which payments hinge on the bids of all bidders.
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for a quadratic cost γ(θˆ2− θˆ1)2 of adopting asymmetric mechanisms with θˆ1 ̸= θˆ2. Asymmet-
ric mechanisms remain optimal if and only if γ < γ∗ (α), where γ∗ (α) strictly increases with
the royalty rate α: when royalty rates are higher, asymmetric mechanism remain optimal
even when the costs of implementing asymmetric mechanisms are higher.
In practice, bidders typically differ ex-ante from a seller’s perspective. In such settings,
the questions become: which bidder does a seller want to favor, and to what extent? We
analyze how different forms of bidder heterogeneity affect the optimal design in a two-bidder,
uniformly-distributed valuation setting. We first show that when bidders have different entry
costs, the seller favors the low cost bidder, because a seller indirectly pays the entry costs.
In contrast, when one bidder has a higher upper support for valuations than the other,
strategic considerations become subtle. We show that if entry costs are low, a seller favors the
weaker bidder, but once entry costs are sufficiently high, the seller favors the stronger bidder.
Two considerations enter a seller’s decision-making: rent-extraction concerns and effi-
ciency concerns. Optimal entry thresholds reflect virtual valuations, not actual valuations.
When entry costs are low, then reflecting the (entry-cost free) logic of Myerson (1981), a
seller favors the weaker bidder to reduce the stronger bidder’s ability to extract informa-
tional rents when its valuation is high. The seller also wants to reduce the probability of
an inefficient, no sale outcome. Concretely, suppose the probability of entry for bidder i
changes from pi to pi +∆p, while that for bidder j changes from pj to pj −∆p. Then, the
probability of no sale becomes
[1− (pi +∆p)][1− (pj −∆p)] = (1− pi) (1− pj)− (∆p)2 − (pi − pj)∆p.
Thus, when pi > pj, increasing pi and decreasing pj is more effective at reducing the proba-
bility of no sale than the reverse. When entry costs are low, the weaker bidder is more likely
to enter, so the rent-extraction logic underlying why the weaker bidder is favored is initially
reinforced by efficiency considerations, magnifying the degree to which the weaker bidder is
favored—beyond the degree prescribed by Myerson when entry is costless. However, as entry
costs rise, so do the optimal cutoffs, and eventually the stronger bidder becomes more likely
to enter. Hence, once entry costs are high enough, it becomes optimal to favor the stronger
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bidder. Thus, there is a non-monotone relationship between entry costs and the degree to
which the weaker bidder is favored (or disfavored).
Greater royalty rates reduce rent-extraction concerns because they lower bidder informa-
tion rents. As a result, when entry costs are low, greater royalty rates make it optimal to
favor the weaker bidder by less, reducing the optimal degree of asymmetry; and when entry
costs are high, greater royalty rates make it optimal to favor the stronger bidder by more,
raising the optimal degree of asymmetry.
Our analysis provides theoretical foundations for negotiated break-up fees that favor one
bidder over another in a takeover auction or the favoring of a particular supplier in pro-
curement auctions. A firm seeking a buyer often elicits an initial bid from one bidder by
promising to reimburse it for its efforts if it is outbid, thereby committing the target firm to
excluding other bidders unless their valuations are sufficiently high.4 In procurements the
US government often provides preferential treatment to domestic firms and small businesses.
Ayres and Cramton (1996) show such preferential treatments enhance seller revenues in auc-
tions for paging licenses by the FCC, in which winning bids of favored bidders are subsidized
by a fixed rate.5 In a setting with ex-ante asymmetric bidders, McAfee and McMillan (1989)
show that favoring ex-ante weaker bidders can enhance auction revenues. In addition to
revealing the revenue-enhancing effect of bid preference policies in a general framework with
heterogeneous bidders, our endogenous entry model provides guidance on how the optimal
design regarding the identity of which bidder to favor and the extent of that favoritism should
vary with the sizes of entry costs and royalty rates, and the nature of bidder asymmetry.
We contribute to research on the optimal design of security auctions without entry costs,
research on standard (symmetric) security auction designs with entry costs, and research
on cash auctions with entry costs. Absent entry costs, Cremer (1987) shows that optimal
securities auctions extract almost all surplus; and DKS show that if a seller restricts bids
to an ordered set of securities and uses a standard auction format, then steeper securities
yield higher revenues. Liu (2016) identifies the optimal mechanism when bidders are het-
4Bates and Lemmon (2003) find that 37% of the firms in their sample sign break-up/termination fees
and 17% grant lock-up options.
5For empirical analyses of the value of bid preference policies in settings with unknown valuations and
costly entry, see Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Athey, Coey, and Levin (2013), and Nakabayashi (2013).
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erogeneous and pay with equities, generalizing Myerson (1981) from cash auctions to equity
auctions. Skrzypacz (2013) reviews the security-bid auction literature. Our contribution is
to identify optimal mechanisms when bidders bid with cash plus royalty payments and incur
entry costs, so that entry is endogenous.6
Fishman (1988) studies takeover contests in which an acquirer faces a potential rival that
must incur a cost to learn its target firm valuation, showing that a high-valuation acquirer
may offer the target a high price to preemptively discourage a rival from becoming informed.
Marquez and Singh (2013) investigate club bidding in private equities, and how entry costs af-
fect club formation and seller profits. Gorbenko and Malenko (2011) endogenize competition
between sellers in the design of security-bid auctions when bidders learn valuations after in-
curring entry costs. Sogo, Bernhardt, and Liu (2016) examine entry decisions in security-bid
auctions when bidders know their valuations prior to entering. These papers study standard
auction formats with entry costs. In contrast, we analyze optimal cash-plus-royalty auction
mechanisms, optimizing over the entire space of symmetric and asymmetric mechanisms.
For cash auctions, Samuelson (1985) was the first to note that a seller can gain by re-
stricting the potential number of bidders. Other cash auction papers that analyze the benefit
of regulating entry include Ye (2007); Bhattacharya, Roberts, and Sweeting (2014); Sweeting
and Bhattacharya (2015); and Quint and Hendricks (2018). Stegeman (1996) studies ex-ante
efficient cash mechanisms with entry costs. Lu (2009) considers revenue-maximizing cash
mechanisms with ex-ante identical bidders, showing that it suffices to focus on the class of
threshold-entry mechanisms. Lu (2009) and Celik and Yilankaya (2009) provide examples of
optimal mechanisms in which bidders enter with asymmetric and positive probabilities. In
contrast, we examine the optimal design of auctions featuring cash and royalty payments,
both when bidders are ex-ante identical and when they differ. We uncover how the nature
of ex-ante bidder heterogeneity, and the sizes of entry costs and royalty rates interact to
jointly determine the optimal design regarding which bidder to favor and the extent, and we
provide a unified intuition for these results.
6Our insights concerning how α affects the direction and extent of the optimal asymmetry should extend
to auctions where bids are from ordered sets of securities (as in DKS) in terms of how the steepness of the
securities affects the optimal design.
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2 Model
There is a risk-neutral seller and n ≥ 1 risk-neutral potential bidders. The indivisible asset
being auctioned has a normalized value of zero if retained by the seller. Bidder i incurs cost
φi > 0 from entering the auction. If bidder i acquires the asset, then it will yield a stochastic
payoff of Zi at date 2. Bidders pay using combinations of cash and royalty/equity where the
royalty payment by winner i is αZi, i.e., the royalty rate α ∈ [0, 1) is the same for all bidders.
At date 0, each potential bidder i receives a private signal θi = E(Zi|θi) about the ex-
pected asset payoff if i wins it. Signals are independently distributed, with θi distributed
according to cdf Fi (θi) and pdf fi (θi), where fi (θi) > 0 is differentiable for θi ∈ [θi, θi]. For
simplicity, we assume a regularity condition that any bidder i’s virtual valuation in pure cash
auctions (Myerson 1981), θi − 1−Fi(θi)fi(θi) , strictly increases in θi, and that θi − 1fi(θi) > φi (i.e.,
virtual valuations exceed entry costs). At date 1, after receiving signals, potential bidders
simultaneously decide whether to enter the auction.
In cash auctions with costly entry, Stegeman (1996, Lemma 1) establishes that it is with-
out loss of generality to restrict attention to semidirect mechanisms in which messages consist
of types augmented by null messages; and Lu (2009, Lemma 1) establishes that among all
semidirect mechanisms, the seller’s expected revenue is maximized by cutoff entry rules in
which only types θi ≥ θˆi of each bidder i participate for some θˆi ∈ [θi, θi]. This result that it
is optimal to have higher types participate extends directly to our setting where the winning
bidder makes both cash and royalty payments, because the royalty rate is fixed. Thus, with-
out loss of generality, we restrict attention to semidirect mechanisms (W,T;α) that induce
a truthful equilibrium with entry cutoffs (θˆ1, · · · , θˆn).
Concretely, after observing θi, bidder i sends a message mi ∈ Mi ≡ [θi, θi] ∪ ∅, where ∅
is a null message (i.e., no entry). Let M ≡ ×iMi. The mechanism (W,T;α) is comprised
of (i) a profile of winning rules W = (W1, . . . ,Wn), where Wi : M → [0, 1] is the probability
that bidder i wins given m = (m1, ..,mi, ...,mn) and
∑
iWi(m) ≤ 1, ∀m ∈ M ; (ii) a profile
of monetary (cash) transfer rules T = (T1, . . . , Tn) with Ti : M → R; and (iii) a royalty rate
α that determines the payment αZi when bidder i wins the auction and the asset pays Zi.
Thus, when m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈M is the profile of reported messages, if mi ∈ [θi, θi], bidder
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i incurs entry cost φ, pays cash Ti(m) to the seller, and wins the auction with probability
Wi(m), in which case he makes royalty payment αZi to the seller; and if mi = ∅, bidder i
does not enter, receives zero payoff, and Wi(m) = Ti(m) = 0. This formulation corresponds
to a setting where a seller may ask losing bidders to make monetary transfers, but cannot
assign the asset or make monetary transfers to non-entrants.
Truthful bidding yields that mi (θi) = θi if θi ∈ [θˆi, θi] and mi (θi) = ∅ if θi ∈ [θi, θˆi).
We define: m (θ) ≡ ×imi (θi), θ−i ≡ (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn) ∈ ×j ̸=i[θj, θj], m−i (θ−i) ≡
×j ̸=imj (θj), f−i (θ−i) ≡ Πj ̸=ifj (θj), and f (θ) ≡ Πifi (θi). Consider bidder i’s expected
profit pii when all other bidders follow their equilibrium strategies. If he reports ∅ (i.e., if i
does not participate), then pii (∅|θi) = 0. If bidder i instead reports θ′i ∈ [θi, θi], then
pii (θ
′
i|θi) ≡ Gi(θ′i)(1− α)θi −
∫
θ−i
Ti(θ
′
i,m−i (θ−i))f−i (θ−i) dθ−i − φi, (1)
where
Gi(θ
′
i) ≡
∫
θ−i
Wi(θ
′
i,m−i (θ−i))f−i (θ−i) dθ−i (2)
is i’s expected winning probability if he reports θ′i and other bidders follow their equilibrium
strategies.
Individual rationality for type θi < θˆi is trivially satisfied because non-participants receive
zero profit. Individual rationality for type θi ≥ θˆi requires
pii (θi) ≡ pii (θi|θi) ≥ 0, ∀θi ≥ θˆi, (3)
where pii (θi) denotes i’s equilibrium profit. Incentive compatibility for type θi ≥ θˆi requires
pii (θi) = max
θ′∈[θi,θi]
pii (θ
′
i|θi) , ∀θi ≥ θˆi; (4)
Incentive compatibility for type θi < θˆi requires
max
θ′∈[θi,θi]
pii(θ
′
i|θi) ≤ 0, ∀θi < θˆi. (5)
A semidirect mechanism (W,T;α) that induces entry cutoffs (θˆ1, · · · , θˆn) is feasible if it
satisfies the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints (3), (4), and (5).
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The seller’s problem is to find a feasible semidirect mechanism with associated entry cutoffs
that maximizes her expected revenue
Πs =
∫
θ
∑
i
[Ti(m(θ)) +Wi(m(θ)) · αθi]f (θ) dθ. (6)
Characterization. By (1), we have that for all θ′i, θi ≥ θˆi,
pii (θ
′
i|θi) = pii (θ′i) + (1− α)Gi(θ′i)(θi − θ′i).
Plugging this into the incentive compatibility constraint (4), yields
pii (θi) ≥ pii (θ′i) + (1− α)Gi(θ′i)(θi − θ′i), ∀θ′i, θi ≥ θˆi. (7)
Equation (7) shows that a high-type bidder earns more rents than a low-type bidder by at
least (1 − α)Gi(θ′i)(θi − θ′i), where θi > θ′i ≥ θˆi. Here, the factor (1 − α) reflects that the
royalty rate ties the payment value to the bidder’s valuation, reducing the bidder’s rents.
Using standard approaches (Myerson 1981; Krishna 2010), we now establish:
Lemma 1 In any feasible semidirect mechanism that induces entry cutoffs (θˆ1, · · · , θˆn),
1. The expected profit of bidder i of type θi is
pii (θi) = pii(θˆi) +
∫ θi
θˆi
(1− α)Gi(t)dt, ∀θi ≥ θˆi, ∀i. (8)
2. The seller’s expected revenue is
Πs =
∫
θ
(∑
i
ξi(θi;α)Wi (m (θ))
)
f (θ) dθ −
∑
i
(
φi + pii(θˆi)
)
(1− Fi(θˆi)), (9)
where
ξi(θi;α) ≡ θi − (1− α) 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
. (10)
All proofs are contained in the Appendix. This lemma extends the standard Myerson
result to auctions with royalty payments and entry costs. Equation (10) is the virtual valua-
tion when bidders pay with a combination of cash and a fixed royalty rate α (Myerson 1981
and Liu 2016), where the factor (1 − α) reflects that security payments allow the seller to
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extract more rents from bidders than pure cash payments, reducing bidder profit. The factor
1 − Fi(θˆi) in the second term of (9) is the (ex-ante) probability that bidder i participates.
Bidder i’s expected entry cost of (1 − Fi(θˆi))φi represents a loss of social surplus that is
eventually borne by the seller via the bidder’s individual rationality requirement.
Lemma 2 In the optimal mechanism among all feasible semidirect mechanisms that induce
entry cutoffs (θˆ1, · · · , θˆn):
1. Among bidders with θj ≥ θˆj, the bidder i with the highest ξi (θi;α) receives the asset.
2. pij(θˆj) = 0 for all j.
3. The seller’s expected revenue is
Πs =
∫
θ
max
{
1{θ1≥θˆ1}ξ1(θ1;α), ...,1{θn≥θˆn}ξn(θn;α)
}
f (θ) dθ−φi
∑
i
(1−Fi(θˆi)), (11)
where 1{θi≥θˆi} is an indicator function.
Thus, in the optimal mechanism, the seller’s revenue is the expected value of the highest
virtual valuation among entrants net of total entry costs. The seller’s problem reduces to
the identification of entry cutoffs (θˆ1, · · · , θˆn) that maximize (11).
3 Ex-ante Identical Bidders
In this section we consider ex-ante identical bidders, so that φi = φ and fi = f for all i.
3.1 Optimal Symmetric Mechanism
To begin, we consider symmetric mechanisms that induce the same entry cutoff θˆi = θˆ for
all bidders. The distribution of the highest type θ1n among n potential bidders is F
n (θ1n).
From (11), the expected revenue in the optimal mechanism with cutoff θˆ is
Π∗(θˆ) ≡
∫ θ¯
θˆ
ξ(θ;α)dF n(θ)− nφ(1− F (θˆ)). (12)
9
The entry cutoff θˆopt that maximizes expected seller payoffs Π∗(θˆ) is characterized by:{
ξ(θˆopt;α)F n−1(θˆopt) = φ, θˆopt ∈ (θ, θ¯) if n ≥ 2
θˆopt = θ if n = 1.
(13)
To see this, observe that dΠ
∗(θˆ)
dθˆ
= −nF n−1(θˆ)f(θˆ)η(θˆ;α, φ) by (12), where η(θˆ;α, φ) ≡
ξ(θˆ;α)− φ
Fn−1(θˆ)
. Because ξ(θˆ;α) increases in θˆ, so does η(θˆ;α, φ), and η(θ¯;α, φ) > 0. For n ≥
2, limθˆ→θ η(θˆ;α, φ) < 0. Therefore, there is a unique θˆ
opt ∈ (θ, θ¯) such that η(θˆopt;α, φ) = 0.
Inspection reveals that dΠ
∗(θˆ)
dθˆ
> 0 if θˆ < θˆopt, and dΠ
∗(θˆ)
dθˆ
< 0 if θˆ > θˆopt. Thus, θˆopt maximizes
Π∗. For n = 1, F n−1(θˆ) = 1 and dΠ
∗(θˆ)
dθˆ
< 0, implying that θ maximizes Π∗.
Increasing α reduces both the informational rents of bidders and the difference between
virtual and real valuations (both ξ and η increase). It follows that greater royalty rates reduce
the optimal entry cutoff. To highlight this starkly, consider the limit case of α → 1 when
n ≥ 2. Then ξ(θ;α = 1) = θ and (13) reduces to θˆoptF n−1(θˆopt) = φ. As the entry cost φ
decreases, so does the optimal entry cutoff θˆopt, going to θˆoptφ=0 = θ as φ→ 0. Then (12) yields
Π∗(θˆoptφ=0;α→1) =
∫ θ¯
θ
θdF n(θ).
Intuitively, when entry is costless, it is optimal to always award the asset (i.e., θˆoptφ=0 = θ > 0;
and as α → 1, the optimal mechanism leaves no rents to bidders, so seller revenue equals
the social welfare gain created by the asset’s allocation. By (12) again, comparing this
costless-entry benchmark and our costly-entry setting where φ > 0 yields
Π∗(θˆoptφ=0;α→1)− Π∗(θˆoptφ>0;α→1) = nφ(1− F (θˆopt)) +
∫ θˆopt
θ
θdF n(θ).
Costly entry reduces a seller’s maximum rents in two ways. The first term captures the
direct cost of entry. The second term reflects an indirect efficiency loss: as reasoned above,
costly entry impairs the efficiency of allocations as it is no longer optimal to always award
the asset—the threshold θˆopt exceeds θ, so a seller foregoes some socially optimal trades.
Restricting entry. We show that with limited uncertainty about bidder valuations, con-
serving on entry costs by restricting entry to one bidder may be optimal; but with more
extensive uncertainty, asymmetric mechanisms that handicap some bidders are best.
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To start, we motivate the tradeoffs associated with exclusion faced by a seller. Fixing
the sum of bidders’ entry probabilities, and thus the total expected direct costs of entry
(the second term in equation (12)), but increasing the number of potential bidders n, has
two opposing effects on social welfare. Conditional on some bidder entering, welfare gains
typically rise with n, as the expected winner’s valuation is higher due to a greater-selection
effect. However, the probability that no bidder enters and no trade occurs also rises with n,
which harms welfare. Intuition for this deterred-entry effect derives from a simple inequality:
Lemma 3 Given n > 1 numbers p1, ..., pn ∈ (0, 1), 1−min{
∑n
j=1 pj, 1} < Πnj=1(1− pj).
Corollary 1 Suppose that rather than n > 1 potential bidders entering with (ex-ante) prob-
abilities p1, ..., pn ∈ (0, 1), a single potential bidder enters with probability min{
∑n
j=1 pj, 1}.
Then, the asset is strictly more likely to be sold, and total expected entry costs are weakly less.
Because expected total entry costs equal the sum of participation probabilities times φ, a
single potential bidder can achieve a higher probability of sale while paying an entry cost that
does not exceed the total entry costs of n potential bidders (i.e., min{Σnj=1pj, 1} ≤ Σnj=1pj).
This is the deterred-entry effect of having more potential bidders. The greater-selection
effect—the value of sampling more bidders to improve the draw of entrants with high
valuations—increases with the extent of variation in bidder valuations. When the varia-
tion in valuations is small enough relative to the entry cost φ, the deterred-entry effect
dominates the greater-selection effect in an extreme form:
Proposition 1 Let bidder valuations be distributed on [θ¯ − ϵ, θ¯]. If ϵ < φ (1− φ
θ¯
)
, then for
any α, expected seller profits are strictly higher in the optimal mechanism with one potential
bidder than in any symmetric mechanism with n ≥ 2 potential bidders.
The proposition provides a sufficient condition that holds for all α and only depends on
ϵ but not the other details of F (·). To illustrate the result, revisit the case of α → 1 and
take the limit ϵ → 0. If there are n ≥ 2 potential bidders, then by ξ(θ;α = 1) = θ, (13)
reduces to θˆoptF n−1(θˆopt) = φ, yielding
F n−1(θˆopt) =
φ
θˆopt
.
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Taking limits on both sides yields
lim
ϵ→0
F n−1(θˆopt) = lim
ϵ→0
φ
θˆopt
=
φ
θ¯
,
where the last equality holds because θˆopt approaches θ¯ as ϵ→ 0. Thus,
lim
ϵ→0
F
(
θˆopt(n)
)
=
(φ
θ¯
) 1
n−1
,
where we index optimal entry cutoff θˆopt by n (for n ≥ 2). Indexing profits Π by n, (12) yields
lim
ϵ→0
Π
(
θˆopt(n), n
)
= lim
ϵ→0
θ¯
∫ θ¯
θˆopt(n)
dF n(θ)− lim
ϵ→0
nφ(1− F (θˆopt(n)))
= lim
ϵ→0
θ¯
(
1− F n
(
θˆopt(n)
))
− lim
ϵ→0
nφ(1− F (θˆopt(n)))
= θ¯
(
1−
(φ
θ¯
) n
n−1
)
− nφ
(
1−
(φ
θ¯
) 1
n−1
)
= θ¯ − θ¯ φ
θ¯
(φ
θ¯
) 1
n−1 − φ
(
1−
(φ
θ¯
) 1
n−1
)
− (n− 1)φ
(
1−
(φ
θ¯
) 1
n−1
)
= θ¯ − φ− (n− 1)φ
(
1−
(φ
θ¯
) 1
n−1
)
, (14)
where the first equality follows from 0 ≤ θ¯−θ ≤ ϵ for all θ ∈ [θˆopt, θ¯] and ∫ θ¯
θˆopt(n)
dF n(θ) ≤ 1.7
For n = 1, because θˆopt(1) = θ = θ¯ − ε by (13), (12) yields
lim
ϵ→0
Π
(
θˆopt(1), 1
)
= θ¯
∫ θ¯
θ¯−ϵ
dF (θ)− φ = θ¯ − φ, (15)
where the first equality holds by a similar argument as that for the first equality of (14). By
(14) and (15), expected revenue strictly decreases in n, maximizing at n = 1.8
3.2 Optimality of Asymmetric Mechanisms
We now show that when the possible valuations of potential bidders differ by enough (vis a` vis
entry costs), then while excluding bidders is not optimal, neither is a symmetric mechanism.
7More concretely, note that 0 ≤ ∫ θ¯
θˆopt(n)
θ¯dFn(θ) − ∫ θ¯
θˆopt(n)
θdFn(θ) ≤ ϵ ∫ θ¯
θˆopt(n)
dFn(θ) ≤ ϵ. Hence, as ϵ
approaches zero,
∫ θ¯
θˆopt(n)
θ¯dFn(θ)− ∫ θ¯
θˆopt(n)
θdFn(θ) goes to zero, establishing the first equality of (14).
8For n ≥ 2, m(1 − a1/m) increases in m = n − 1 for a < 1: letting b = 1/m, the derivative with respect
to m is 1− ab(1− ln(ab)) > 0, as ddxx(1− ln(x)) = − ln(x) > 0 for x < 1, and limx→1 x(1− ln(x))→ 1.
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For simplicity, we focus on n = 2. We first consider α→ 1, where the tradeoffs are simpler.
As α→ 1, seller revenue in (11) in the optimal (possibly asymmetric) mechanism reduces to∫ θ¯
θˆ2
∫ θ¯
θˆ1
max {θ1, θ2} dF (θ1) dF (θ2) + F (θˆ2)
∫ θ¯
θˆ1
θ1dF (θ1) + F (θˆ1)
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
θ2dF (θ2)
− φ(2− F (θˆ1)− F (θˆ2)). (16)
The first term in (16) is the social welfare gain when both bidders enter, and the second and
third are the social welfare gains when only one of the bidders enters.
We next establish a benchmark result for the case of α→ 1 that asymmetric mechanisms
that handicap one bidder are optimal when valuations can differ sufficiently:
Proposition 2 Suppose (i) df(θ)
f(θ)
> − 1
(θ¯−θ) ln
θ¯
(θ¯−θ) for all θ ∈
[
θ, θ¯
]
, i.e., the pdf does not de-
crease too quickly, and (ii) there is enough valuation uncertainty that θ¯−E [θ] > φ. Then, as
α approaches 1, optimal mechanisms are asymmetric, with both bidders entering with strictly
positive but different (ex-ante) probabilities. That is, θˆopt1 ̸= θˆopt2 and max{θˆopt1 , θˆopt2 } < θ¯.
Proposition 2 provides conditions under which the optimal mechanism with ex-ante iden-
tical bidders is asymmetric, so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different (ex-ante)
probabilities, a result that does not hinge on large entry costs (see condition (ii)). To see
the logic, consider a small spread away from a symmetric mechanism with entry thresholds
θˆ1 = θˆ2 = θˆ, where each bidder enters with probability p ∈ (0, 1), to an asymmetric mecha-
nism with entry thresholds θˆ1 = θˆ− ϵ and θˆ2 = θˆ+ ϵ∗, where ϵ and ϵ∗ are chosen so that one
bidder enters with probability p+∆p and the other enters with probability p−∆p.
Introducing this asymmetry reduces the probability of no sale from (1− p)2 to (1− p)2−
(∆p)2, while leaving total expected entry costs unchanged.9 However, it forsakes some choice
when the higher valuation bidder is excluded. Condition (i) ensures that the density does
not decline so quickly that the potential (and hence expected) value of that foregone choice
is too high, making it always optimal to spread the cutoffs of a symmetric mechanism. Con-
dition (ii) ensures that always excluding a bidder (in which case, it is optimal for the other
9This intuition leads to the optimality of asymmetric mechanism only when φ > 0. Absent entry costs,
the logic breaks down: the optimal mechanism features p = 1, so one cannot have a probability of p+∆p.
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bidder always to enter, because φ < θ) is not optimal: the left-hand side of θ¯ − E[θ] > φ
is the expected benefit of entry by a bidder with valuation θ¯ when the other bidder always
enters, while the right-hand side is the cost.
The optimality of asymmetric mechanisms extends beyond optimal securities auctions
that use steep securities (α → 1) to extract full rents, to hold for optimal mechanisms fea-
turing any fixed royalty rate α ∈ [0, 1) plus cash. To highlight this, the remainder of the
paper specializes to two bidders and sufficient uniform uncertainty over valuations on [θ, θ¯]:
Assumption A1: There are two potential bidders whose valuations are independently and
uniformly distributed on [θ, θ¯] with 2θ − θ¯ > φ and θ¯−θ
2
> φ.
In this uniform distribution setting, the condition 2θ − θ¯ > φ is equivalent to our earlier
assumption that φ < θ − 1
f(θ)
. It ensures that with a single potential entrant, the optimal
cutoff is θ.10 We now show that the qualitative content of Proposition 2 holds for all fixed
royalty rates α ∈ [0, 1] given only slightly stronger sufficient conditions:
Proposition 3 Under A1, for any α,
(i) The optimal mechanism is asymmetric, with both bidders entering with strictly positive
but different probabilities.
(ii) If, in addition, α > 2(2θ¯−3θ)
3(θ¯−θ) , then in the optimal mechanism, one bidder always enters
and the other bidder enters with an ex-ante probability strictly between zero and one, where
the cutoff valuation is θ +
√
2φ(θ¯−θ)
2−α ∈ (θ, θ¯). This cutoff strictly increases in α.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3 that one bidder always enters (θˆ1 = θ) and the other
bidder enters only when its valuation exceeds a cutoff θˆ2. It shows how the optimal cutoff θˆ2
increases in both φ and α; that is, greater φ or α increases the optimal degree of asymmetry.
When α > 2(2θ¯−3θ)
3(θ¯−θ) , a slight increase in the spread between θˆ1 and θˆ2 raises seller
revenues—the benefit of increased probability of including one bidder swamps the cost of
increased probability of excluding the other bidder when its valuation is higher. But then
the optimum features a boundary solution. However, as explained below Proposition 2, the
condition θ¯ − E[θ] = 1
2
(
θ¯ − θ) > φ ensures that it is not optimal to always exclude one
10Given this condition, the virtual valuation for a fixed royalty rate α plus cash, (10), calculated at θ,
exceeds φ for any α.
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(a) θˆ1 and θˆ2 as a function of φ (α = 0.5).
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(b) θˆ1 and θˆ2 as a function of α (φ = 1).
Figure 1: Optimal entry cutoffs θˆ1 and θˆ2 as a function of φ and α when bidder valuations
are independently uniformly distributed on [9, 12] and φ < 1.5 so A1 holds.
bidder, implying that it is optimal for one bidder to always enter, and for the other to enter
with an ex-ante probability between zero and one. In this case, first-order conditions yield
that the other potential bidder should enter when its valuation is at least θ+
√
2φ(θ¯−θ)
2−α < θ¯.
Proposition 3 offers insights into the factors that affect the relative merits of symmetric
and asymmetric mechanisms, as bidders earn strictly positive rents that depend on the roy-
alty rate α and differ between these two types of mechanisms. Proposition 3 reveals that the
benefit of the asymmetric mechanism rises with α. Greater αmake the condition α >
2(2θ¯−3θ)
3(θ¯−θ)
less stringent. While α does not affect the social welfare benefits of spreading, the proof re-
veals that spreading the entry thresholds increases total bidder payoffs at a seller’s expense.
Decreased tying (reduced α) raises bidder profits, magnifying this effect, especially when the
entry threshold is low.11 The conditions in the proposition ensure that the positive effect of
spreading on social welfare outweighs the negative effect of increasing total bidder payoffs.
With entry costs, expected revenues in the optimal mechanism increase in α for two rea-
sons. First, increasing the royalty rate α reduces the profit of the bidder who always enters.
In turn, this reduces the value that the seller attaches to entry by the other bidder. Thus,
second, the seller can further increase revenue by setting a higher entry threshold for the
other bidder, i.e., increasing the degree of asymmetry in cutoffs.
Implementation costs for asymmetric mechanisms. Any optimal asymmetric mecha-
11By (8) in Lemma 1 and pij(θˆj) = 0 in Lemma 2, bidder i’s expected profit given signal θi is
(1−α) ∫ θi
θˆi
Gi(θ)dθ, where Gi (θ) is the probability that i wins given signal θ. This profit decreases in α and θˆi.
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nism that induces entry cutoffs (θˆopt1 , θˆ
opt
2 ) with θˆ
opt
1 < θˆ
opt
2 can be implemented by a second-
price auction with reserve price ri = (1 − α)θˆopti for bidder i ∈ {1, 2} and entry subsidy
φ to any entrant i whose bid exceeds ri, where the auction winner i makes the additional
royalty payment αZi with α ∈ [0, 1).12 These reserve prices and subsidy reflect that after
entering the auction, entry costs are sunk, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a bidder with
valuation θ to bid (1−α)θ in the second-price auction with royalty rate α, and each entrant
is reimbursed with its entry cost to address individual rationality.
In practice, asymmetric mechanisms may be costly to implement. For example, there
may be legal costs of discriminating between bidders in auctions that feature asymmetric
rules or complexity costs associated with inducing an asymmetric equilibrium among the
multiple-equilibria in auctions that use symmetric rules.13 To model this we add a quadratic
cost γ(θˆ2 − θˆ1)2 for asymmetric mechanisms with θˆ1 ̸= θˆ2.
Proposition 4 Suppose A1 holds, and there is a quadratic cost γ(θˆ2 − θˆ1)2 for adopting
mechanisms with θˆ2 ̸= θˆ1. Then an asymmetric mechanism with θˆ1 ̸= θˆ2 is optimal if and
only if γ < γ∗ (α), where
γ∗(α) ≡ 2θ − θ¯ + (θ¯ − θ)α
4(θ¯ − θ)2
increases in α.
One might posit that because the costs of slight separation are only of second order, some
separation is always optimal under A1. However, this logic is flawed: the benefits of slight
separation are also of second order. In fact, asymmetric mechanisms are optimal if and only
if the asymmetry cost parameter γ is sufficiently small, i.e., γ < γ∗(α). γ∗(α) increases in α—
with higher royalty rates, asymmetric mechanism can remain optimal even when the costs of
implementing asymmetric mechanisms are higher. This result reinforces our earlier findings
that the relative benefit of asymmetric mechanisms over symmetric ones increases in α.
12With ex-ante symmetric bidders, this mechanism corresponds to that used in the proof of Lemma 2,
and as the proof of the lemma shows, it implements the optimal mechanism.
13Campbell (1998) provides a sufficient condition for the existence of asymmetric equilibria in second-price
auctions with two bidders.
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4 Heterogeneous Bidders
The preceding analysis establishes how strategic considerations can lead a seller to treat bid-
ders heterogeneously even when bidders are ex-ante identical so that the choice of which bid-
der to favor is arbitrary. In practice, ex ante, a seller is often aware of dimensions along which
potential bidders differ. For example, a target firm may believe that one potential acquiring
firm is more likely to have higher synergies than another. The target could reinforce the
initial asymmetry by favoring the bidder with the higher expected synergies. Alternatively,
it could encourage participation by the bidder with lower expected synergies by favoring it.
We now address how asymmetries in primitives affect a seller’s choice of which bidder to
favor, and how extensive such favoritism should be. That is, we derive how different forms
of ex-ante bidder heterogeneity affect the optimal auction design. We first consider a setting
where bidders have different entry costs φi, but are otherwise identical. We then consider
bidders who have different supports for their valuation distributions Fi.
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4.1 Heterogeneity in entry costs
We first show that when bidders differ in φi, there is a natural bidder to favor—the low entry
cost bidder—making the optimal way to select the favored bidder unique. Thus, in contrast
to the costless entry setting of Myerson (1981), there is a discontinuity in the optimal degree
of asymmetry with respect to the underlying bidder heterogeneity.
Assumption A1′: There are two potential bidders whose valuations are independently and
identically uniformly distributed on [θ, θ¯], but who have different entry costs φ2 > φ1 > 0,
where 2θ − θ¯ > φ1 and θ¯−θ2 > φ2.
Proposition 5 Under A1′, the optimal mechanism favors the low cost entrant: θˆ1 < θˆ2 < θ¯.
The intuition is straightforward. Because bidder valuations are symmetrically distributed,
when it is optimal to favor one bidder in the auction design, efficiency considerations mandate
that the seller should favor the bidder with lower entry costs.
14In our fixed royalty rate setting, project investment costs (as in DKS) do not affect outcomes, even if
they differ between bidders. Such costs do matter in pure equity auctions, where investment costs affect a
bidder’s information advantage and favoring bidders with smaller investment costs is optimal (Liu, 2016).
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4.2 Heterogeneity in the distribution of bidder valuations
We now consider bidders who have the same lower support θ for their valuations, but differ-
ent upper supports. Without loss of generality, we suppose that θ¯1 > θ¯2. We again assume
2θ−2θ¯1 > 0. We will show that with heterogeneous supports, the size of φ is critical for deter-
mining which bidder to favor and the extent. Accordingly, we place minimal restrictions on
φ, requiring only that φ < θ¯1 (φ ≥ θ¯1 is uninteresting because zero entry becomes optimal).
With uniformly-distributed valuations, the virtual valuation (10) of bidder i ∈ {1, 2} is
ξi(θi) = θi − (1− α)
(
θ¯i − θi
)
(17)
= (2− α) θi − (1− α) θ¯i.
Bidder 1 corresponds to the “strong bidder” in Myerson (1981). Myerson shows that without
entry costs, optimal selling mechanisms handicap this strong bidder. The logic is that if both
bidders have the same valuation θ, then the strong bidder has a lower virtual valuation, so the
seller benefits from setting a higher reserve price for this bidder. Extending this to our costly
entry setting, one might conjecture that it should be optimal to “favor” weak bidder 2 by set-
ting a lower threshold for bidder 2. Counterintuitively, we establish that when entry is costly,
the optimal bidder to favor varies, depending on both the entry costs and the royalty rate.
The logic reflects the insight highlighted earlier underlying how asymmetric thresholds af-
fect the probability of no sale. We explain in two steps. As a starting point, consider a small
spread away from an initial position with identical thresholds θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 ∈
(
θ,min
(
θ¯1, θ¯2
))
, so
that bidder i enters with probability pi = (θ¯i − θ∗i )/(θ¯i − θ), to asymmetric entry thresholds
θˆ1 = θ
∗
1−ϵ∗ and θˆ2 = θ∗2+ϵ, where ϵ and ϵ∗ are chosen so that bidder 1 enters with probability
p1+∆p and bidder 2 with p2−∆p. Importantly, unlike the symmetric case, now p1 > p2 even
though initial entry thresholds are identical, θ∗1 = θ
∗
2. The probability of no sale becomes
[1− (p1 +∆p)][1− (p2 −∆p)] = (1− p1) (1− p2)− (∆p)2 − (p1 − p2)∆p.
This equation conveys the key change introduced by heterogeneity in bidders’ valuation dis-
tributions. The second term − (∆p)2 is negative regardless of the sign of ∆p; this reflects
the advantage of introducing asymmetric cutoffs as in a symmetric setting. However, now,
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there is a third term, − (p1 − p2)∆p, which is negative only if ∆p > 0. This means that
when p1 > p2, increasing p1 and decreasing p2 is more effective at reducing the probability
of no sale than increasing p2 and decreasing p1. Thus, favoring bidder 1 increases efficiency.
Next, recognize that the threshold choices θ∗1 and θ
∗
2 should reflect virtual valuations, not
actual valuations. Heuristically, one can think of θ∗1 and θ
∗
2 as solving a constrained optimiza-
tion problem: maximize a seller’s expected revenue Πs subject to an equal virtual valuation
constraint, ξ1(θ
∗
1) = ξ2(θ
∗
2) ≡ ξ∗. With heterogeneity in the distribution of valuations, the so-
lution typically features θ∗1 ̸= θ∗2, and, as we detail, p1 may be either larger or smaller than p2.
Thus, collectively, there are two consequences to favoring a “strong” bidder. First, My-
erson’s logic implies that favoring the stronger bidder reduces a seller’s ability to extract
informational rents. Because greater equity shares α reduce bidder information rents, this
force declines when α increases. Second, there is an efficiency effect, the direction of which
depends on whether p1 > p2 or p1 < p2. Recall that θ
∗
1 and θ
∗
2 solve the constrained opti-
mization problem. Therefore, ξ∗ increases in φ. In a benchmark setting where φ approaches
0, entry becomes almost costless, and Myerson’s logic implies that the optimal mechanism
features θ∗1 > θ
∗
2 = θ: because ξ2(θ) > 0 by 2θ > θ¯i, the optimal design features θ
∗
2 = θ
and ξ1(θ
∗
1) = ξ2(θ).
15 As a result, p1 < p2 = 1. When φ is positive but small, the efficiency
considerations embodied in the third term “− (p1 − p2)∆p” reinforce the Myerson logic, i.e.,
it becomes optimal to increase θˆ1 even further above θˆ2, beyond the degree when entry is
costless. However, because ξ∗ increases in φ and ξ1(θ¯1) > ξ2(θ¯2), as φ is increased, p1 even-
tually reaches p2. Beyond that point, further increases in φ raise p1 past p2, making it more
effective to reduce the probability of no sale by closing the gap between θˆ1 and θˆ2. When
this efficiency effect is strong enough to overcome the Myerson logic (which falls with α), the
difference θˆ1−θˆ2 not only shrinks, but it reverses sign: the optimal design can feature θˆ1 < θˆ2.
For simplicity, we first consider the limiting case where θ¯2 approaches θ, i.e., there is
little uncertainty about the weak bidder’s valuation. This yields a closed-form solution that
demonstrates how the two forces play out. We then illustrate numerically how the intuition
15In the special case of costless entry, φ = 0, the value of θ∗1 is not unique: any value below the solution of
ξ1(θ
∗
1) = ξ2(θ), e.g., θ
∗
1 = θ, can also be optimal, even though bidder types with values below ξ1(θ
∗
1) = ξ2(θ)
have no chance of winning. This non-uniqueness reflects that when φ = 0, social welfare is not wasted by entry
of bidder types with no chance of winning. Once φ is positive, it is not optimal to have such bidder types enter.
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extends when θ¯2− θ is non-negligible. To ease presentation, we work with the probability of
entry rather than the threshold of entry for the weak bidder 2, defining p2 ≡ θ¯2−θˆ2θ¯2−θ to be the
probability that the bidder enters, i.e., θˆ2 = θ + (1− p2) (θ¯2 − θ). We have:
Proposition 6 Assume uniform distribution, 2θ − θ¯1 > 0 and φ < θ¯1. Consider the case
where θ¯2 approaches θ. Then there exists a cutoff value φ
∗ (α) ∈ (0, θ¯1 − θ) (defined in the
proof), with dφ
∗(α)
dα
< 0 such that
(i) If φ ∈ (0, φ∗ (α)), then the weak bidder always enters, p2 = 1, and
θˆ1 =
(1− α) θ¯1 + θ + φ
2− α > θ. (18)
θˆ1 strictly decreases in α, and strictly increases in φ (
∂θˆ1
∂φ
> 0), where the rate of increase
grows with the royalty rate α ( ∂
2θˆ1
∂α∂φ
> 0).
(ii) If φ ∈ (φ∗ (α) , θ¯1) and α > 0,16 then the weak bidder never enters, p2 = 0, and
θˆ1 =
{
θ if φ ≤ (2− α) θ − (1− α) θ¯1
(1−α)θ¯1+φ
(2−α) if φ > (2− α) θ − (1− α) θ¯1,
(19)
which weakly decreases in α.
(iii) θˆ1 is nonmonotone in φ: it decreases as φ crosses φ
∗(α), limφ→φ∗(α)− θˆ1 > limφ→φ∗(α)+ θˆ1,
but it weakly increases in φ, ∂θˆ1
∂φ
≥ 0 for φ > φ∗(α).
These results show that in the limit as φ approaches 0, the logic of the costless Myerson
benchmark obtains, so that θˆ2 = θ and θˆ1 > θ. Then, as the entry cost φ rises, θˆ2 remains at θ,
but θˆ1 continuously increases, where the rate at which θˆ1 increases in φ rises when the royalty
rate α is higher. Eventually, φ reaches φ∗ (α), at which point θˆ1 falls to θ and the probabil-
ity that bidder 2 enters falls to 0, i.e., θˆ2 = θ¯2. Once φ reaches a second-higher threshold,
max
{
φ∗ (α) , (2− α) θ − (1− α) θ¯1
}
, θˆ1 increases again while the probability that bidder 2
enters remains at 0. Finally, increases in α reduce the optimal magnitude of asymmetry when
φ is small, but increase it when φ is large: θˆ1 decreases in α regardless of whether φ < φ
∗ (α)
or φ > φ∗ (α); but p2 = 1 when the entry cost is small, and p2 = 0 when the entry cost is large.
16Even when α = 0 and φ > φ∗(α) or α is arbitrary and φ = φ∗(α), p2 = 0 and (19) are still a solution
for the optimization. However, other solutions may also exist.
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These findings reflect the intuition highlighted earlier. First, when entry costs are small,
it is optimal to magnify the threshold difference in the direction of the Myerson logic, fur-
ther favoring the weak bidder—beyond the degree when entry is costless. However, once
entry costs are sufficiently large, the reverse—favoring a “strong” bidder—becomes opti-
mal. Further, the relative importance of efficiency considerations—as embodied in the term
“− (p1 − p2)∆p”—increases with φ (i.e., p1− p2 becomes large when the entry cost is high),
and as entry cost rises, there is a “regime change” when the efficiency consideration becomes
more important than the rent-extraction (Myerson) consideration. Moreover, for any given
entry cost, the relative importance of rent-extraction considerations decreases in α because
higher α reduces bidder rents. It follows that when entry costs are low, greater royalty rates
make it optimal to favor the weaker bidder by less, reducing the optimal degree of asym-
metry; but when entry costs are high, greater royalty rates make it optimal to favor the
stronger bidder by more, raising the optimal degree of asymmetry.
(a) α = 0 (b) α = 0.15
(c) α = 0.30 (d) α = 0.45
Figure 2: Optimal entry cutoffs θˆ1 and θˆ2 as a function of entry cost φ for different royalty
rates α with independently uniformly distributed valuations, over [3, 5] for bidder 1 and
[3, 4] for bidder 2. That is, bidder 1 is stronger than bidder 2.
Figure 2 illustrates how the key ideas in Proposition 6 extend to settings in which θ¯2−θ is
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non-negligible. It plots optimal cutoffs for a strong bidder 1 whose valuation θ1 is drawn from
a uniform distribution on [3, 5] and a weak bidder 2 whose valuation θ2 is drawn from a uni-
form distribution on [3, 4], for four fixed royalty rates α. The figure indicates that it is optimal
to favor the weak bidder when the entry cost φ is small: θˆ1 > θˆ2 = θ. As φ rises, θˆ2 remains at
θ, but θˆ1 continuously increases. However, eventually φ hits a critical value at which the op-
timal entry cutoffs discontinuously reverse so that θˆ1 < θˆ2. That is, once φ exceeds a critical
value, it becomes optimal to favor the strong bidder. This critical value decreases in α reflect-
ing that the relative importance of efficiency concerns increases with α.17 Further, increases
in α make it optimal to favor a weak bidder by less, i.e., θˆ1− θˆ2 shrinks when entry costs are
low; but to favor a strong bidder by more, i.e., θˆ2 − θˆ1 expands when entry cost are high.
5 Conclusion
With entry costs, optimal selling mechanisms trade off between the increased rents that more
entrants can bring and the higher total entry costs incurred by more bidders that a seller in-
directly bears via the endogenous entry choices. We establish that as long as there is enough
uncertainty over bidder valuations relative to entry costs, it is optimal to handicap some
bidders in order to encourage other bidders to enter. When bidders are ex-ante identical,
greater royalty rates differentially reduce the profit of a bidder who enters more frequently,
making it optimal to raise the reserve for another bidder.
In practice, bidders typically differ ex ante in their attributes. We derive how the nature
of ex-ante bidder heterogeneity affects a seller’s choice of which bidder, if any, to favor, and
how extensively to favor that bidder. When bidders differ in their participation costs, effi-
ciency considerations lead a seller to favor the low entry cost bidder. Optimal designs are
more complex when a seller knows that one bidder is likely to have a higher valuation than
another. The rent extraction considerations present in Myerson’s (1981) costless entry set-
ting provide incentives to favor the weaker bidder in order to extract more informational rents
17These patterns of reversal and nonmonotonicity with respect to entry costs are unique features of
settings with heterogeneous bidders, where, as Proposition 6 and the example show, at each φ there is
typically a unique optimum. With ex-ante identical bidders, at each φ there are typically two equilibria
(one with θˆ1 < θˆ2 and the other with θˆ1 > θˆ2) and no transition can be discerned.
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from the stronger bidder when its valuation is high. However, a seller also wants to minimize
the probability of no sale. If entry costs are low, the weaker bidder is more likely to enter so
the seller favors the weaker bidder beyond the degree prescribed by Myerson, thereby reduc-
ing the probability of no sale. However, as entry costs rise, so do optimal entry cutoffs, and
eventually the stronger bidder becomes more likely to enter. Once entry costs rise by enough,
it becomes optimal to favor the stronger bidder. Greater royalty rates reduce the optimal
degree of asymmetry if entry costs are low, but increase the asymmetry if entry costs are high.
Our analysis provides theoretical foundations for the asymmetric auction designs of pro-
curement auctions that favor certain designated suppliers, and the designs of wireless spec-
trum auctions that favor particular types of bidders. So, too, target firms in takeover auctions
frequently design bidding rules that favor one bidder over another (see, e.g., Povel and Singh,
2006). For example, a target often elicits an initial bid from one bidder by promising to re-
imburse it with a break-up fee that compensates the bidder for its efforts. This commits the
target firm to excluding other bidders unless their valuations are sufficiently high.
In the appendix, we contrast our setting with one in which potential bidders only learn
valuations after entering. We establish that when potential bidders do not have an informa-
tion advantage over the seller when making entry decisions, the seller can extract all bidder
rents by using lump-sum transfers: tying payments to valuations is unnecessary. More-
over, the seller need not handicap particular bidders when bidders are ex-ante identical—the
optimal amount of entry arises endogenously in equilibrium.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: By (1) and (4), pii (·) is the maximum of a family of affine functions,
so it is convex. Because pii (·) is also bounded and hence absolutely continuous, it is dif-
ferentiable almost everywhere in the interior of its domain. By (7), at all θ′i > θˆi, a line
at θ′i with a slope of (1 − α)Gi(θ′i) supports the function pii (·). Thus, at each point that
pii (·) is differentiable, dpii(θi)dθi = (1−α)Gi(θi). The first part of the lemma follows because an
absolutely continuous function is the definite integral of its derivative.
The seller’s expected revenues (6) can be rewritten as
∑
i
∫ θi
θˆi
∫
θ−i
[Ti(θi,m−i(θ−i)) +Wi(θi,m−i(θ−i)) · αθi]f−i (θ−i) dθ−idFi (θi)
=
∑
i
∫ θi
θˆi
[∫
θ−i
Ti(θi,m−i(θ−i))f−i (θ−i) dθ−i +Gi (θi) · αθi
]
dFi (θi)
=
∑
i
∫ θi
θˆi
[
Gi(θi)θi −
∫ θi
θˆi
(1− α)Gi(t)dt− pii(θˆi)− φi
]
dFi (θi)
=
∑
i
∫ θi
θˆi
[
Gi(θi)θi −
∫ θi
θˆi
(1− α)Gi(t)dt
]
dFi (θi)−
∑
i
(1− Fi(θˆi))
(
pii(θˆi) + φi
)
,
where the second equality follows from substituting for
∫
θ−i
Ti(θi,m−i (θ−i))f−i (θ−i) dθ−i us-
ing (1) and then substituting for pii(θi) using (8). Further,∫ θi
θˆi
∫ θi
θˆi
(1− α)Gi(t)dtdFi (θi) =
∫ θi
θˆi
(1− α) (1− Fi (θi))Gi (θi) dθi
follows from integrating by parts, so the seller’s expected revenue can be rewritten as
∑
i
∫ θi
θˆi
[
θi − (1− α) 1− Fi (θi)
fi (θi)
]
Gi(θi)dFi (θi)−
∑
i
(1− Fi(θˆi))
(
pii(θˆi) + φi
)
=
∑
i
∫ θi
θˆi
∫
θ−i
ξi(θi;α)Wi(θi,m−i (θ−i))f (θ) dθ −
∑
i
(1− Fi(θˆi))
(
pii(θˆi) + φi
)
=
∑
i
∫
θ
ξi(θi;α)Wi(m (θ))f (θ) dθ −
∑
i
(1− Fi(θˆi))
(
pii(θˆi) + φi
)
.
The first equality follows from substituting (2) for Gi(θi) and the definition of ξi(θi;α) in (10).
The last equality holds because Wi(m (θ)) = 0 if mi (θi) = ∅ and mi (θi) = ∅ for θi < θˆi. □
24
Proof of Lemma 2: We first show that the expected revenue in (11) is attainable. Consider
the following mechanism: Given reports m ∈M , letW be such that the seller gives the asset
to the bidder who reports mi ̸= ∅ and has the highest ξi (θi;α) such that mi = θi ≥ θˆi. For
any given θ−i, denote the infimum of all bids such that bidder i can win against θ−i by
zi (θ−i) ≡ inf{θi ≥ θˆi : ξi (θi;α) ≥ ξj (θj;α) , ∀j ∈ {k : θk ≥ θˆk}}
and, for any given reports m ∈M , let the payment rule be
Ti (m) =

(1− α) zi(θ−i)− φi if bidder i wins
−φi if mi = θi ≥ θˆi and bidder i loses
0 if mi = ∅ or mi < θˆi.
We show that truth-telling is an equilibrium. For type θi < θˆi, it is optimal to report ∅ and
not enter because, if he instead entered and bids above θˆi (so that his entry cost could be reim-
bursed), his winning profit would be negative. Next, suppose that type θi ≥ θˆi reports θ′i > θi
instead of θi. If zi(θ−i) > θ′i > θi, then bidder i still loses; if θ
′
i ≥ zi(θ−i) > θi, then bidder i
wins and makes a negative profit of (1−α)θi−φi−((1−α)zi(θ−i)−φi) = (1−α)(θi−zi(θ−i))
rather than the zero profit it would have received from bidding θi; and if θ
′
i > θi ≥ zi(θ−i),
then bidder i still wins and makes the same profit. Suppose that type θi ≥ θˆi reports θ′i < θi
instead of θi. If zi(θ−i) ≥ θi > θ′i, then bidder i still loses; if θi > zi(θ−i) > θ′i, then bidder i
loses and makes a zero profit instead of making the positive profit of (1−α)(θi−zi(θ−i)) that
it would have received from bidding θi; and if θi > θ
′
i ≥ zi(θ−i), then bidder i still wins and
makes the same profit. Thus, truth-telling is an equilibrium. Further, because pii(θˆi) = 0 for
all i in this mechanism, (9) reduces to (11), proving that (11) is attainable.
Observe that the first term on the right-hand side of (9) cannot exceed that of (11) (the
equality holds if and only if the first part of the lemma is satisfied), and neither does the sec-
ond term by pii(θˆi) ≥ 0,∀i. Thus, (11) is the expected revenue in the optimal mechanism. □
Proof of Proposition 1: With a single potential bidder and any α, a seller can al-
ways extract a surplus of at least θ¯ − ϵ − φ by making a take-it-or-leave-it cash demand
of (1 − α)(θ¯ − ϵ) − φ, together with the royalty payment associated with the fixed rate α.
This leaves the lowest valuation type θ¯−ϵ indifferent to entry. Hence, Π (p, n = 1) ≥ θ¯−ϵ−φ.
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Now consider n > 1 potential bidders. If the probability that each bidder enters is p, the
seller’s payoff is bounded as follows:
Π (p, n > 1) < (1− (1− p)n) θ¯ − npφ, (20)
where 1 − (1− p)n is the probability that at least one potential bidder enters. Thus,
(1− (1− p)n) θ¯ is an upper bound on welfare gains and npφ is the expected entry cost (the
inequality is slack because the winner’s type is typically below θ¯ and bidders may earn posi-
tive rents). Maximizing the right-hand side of (20) with respect to p yields p∗ = 1− (φ
θ¯
)
1
n−1 .
Substituting this into the right-hand side of (20) yields
Π (p, n > 1) < θ¯ − nφ+ (n− 1)
(
φ
θ¯
) 1
n−1
φ.
One can show that the right-hand side decreases in n for n ≥ 2. Thus,
Π (p, n > 1) < θ¯ − 2φ+ φ
2
θ¯
< θ¯ − ε− φ ≤ Π(p, n = 1) ,
where the second inequality follows from ϵ < φ
(
1− φ
θ¯
)
. □
Proof of Proposition 2: Explicitly writing out the max term in (16) yields that, for θˆ1 ≤ θˆ2,
Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2) =
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
(∫ θ2
θˆ1
θ2dF (θ1) +
∫ θ¯
θ2
θ1dF (θ1)
)
dF (θ2)
+ F (θˆ2)
∫ θ¯
θˆ1
θ1dF (θ1) + F (θˆ1)
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
θ2dF (θ2)− φ(2− F (θˆ1)− F (θˆ2)). (21)
We first show that if φ < θ¯−E [θ], then always excluding a bidder (without loss of generality
bidder 2) is not optimal. If only bidder 1 enters then because φ < θ, setting θˆ1 = θ is
optimal. Differentiating (21) at (θˆ1 = θ, θˆ2 = θ¯) with respect to θˆ2 yields
∂Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)
∂θˆ2
∣∣∣∣
θˆ1=θ, θˆ2=θ¯
= −f (θ¯) (θ¯ − E[θ]− φ) < 0, (22)
where the inequality holds by θ¯−E [θ] > φ. Thus, always excluding a bidder is not optimal.
We now show that symmetric mechanisms with θˆ1 = θˆ2 are never optimal. Because al-
ways excluding a bidder and always having two bidders (i.e., setting θˆ1 = θˆ2 = θ) are never
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optimal, without loss of generality suppose that θˆ1 ≤ θˆ2 ∈
(
θ, θ¯
)
. Consider the asymmetric
mechanism: θˆ2 = θ
∗+ϵ and θˆ1 = θ∗−ϵ∗, where ϵ is small and ϵ∗ solves F (θ∗)−F (θ∗ − ϵ∗) =
F (θ∗ + ϵ)− F (θ∗) ≡ ∆p. Using “o” to stand for “terms of order,” we have
∆p = f (θ∗) ϵ+ o
(
ϵ2
)
and ϵ∗ = ϵ+ o
(
ϵ2
)
.
We show that ∆Π∗ = Π∗ (θ∗ − ϵ∗, θ∗ + ϵ)−Π∗ (θ∗, θ∗) > 0. We need only compare terms
concerning social welfare because ϵ∗ is set to equate the terms with φ in both mechanisms.
We retain terms up to order ϵ2. There exist contributions to ∆Π∗ only in 3 cases:
Case 1: θ2 ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + ϵ) and θ1 ∈ (θ∗ − ϵ∗, θ∗). The contribution to ∆Π∗ is
− (∆p)2 (ϵ+ o (ϵ2)) = 0 + o (ϵ3) .
Case 2: θ2 ∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + ϵ) and θ1 /∈ (θ∗ − ϵ∗, θ∗). The contribution exists only when
θ1 ∈ (θ, θ∗ − ϵ∗) and it is
−∆p (F (θ∗)−∆p)
(
θ∗ +
ϵ
2
+ o
(
ϵ2
))
= −∆p (F (θ∗)−∆p)
(
θ∗ +
ϵ
2
)
+ o
(
ϵ3
)
= −∆pF (θ∗)
(
θ∗ +
ϵ
2
)
+ (∆p)2 θ∗ + o
(
ϵ3
)
.
Case 3: θ2 /∈ (θ∗, θ∗ + ϵ) and θ1 ∈ (θ∗ − ϵ∗, θ∗). The contribution exists only when
θ2 ∈ (θ, θ∗) and it is
∆pF (θ∗)
(
θ∗ − ϵ
2
+ o
(
ϵ2
))
= ∆pF (θ∗)
(
θ∗ − ϵ
2
)
+ o
(
ϵ3
)
.
Adding up all contributions from the 3 cases yields
∆Π∗ =∆pF (θ∗)
(
θ∗ − ϵ
2
)
−∆pF (θ∗)
(
θ∗ +
ϵ
2
)
+ (∆p)2 θ∗ + o
(
ϵ3
)
=∆p (∆pθ∗ − F (θ∗) ϵ) + o (ϵ3)
=∆pϵ (f (θ∗) θ∗ − F (θ∗)) + o (ϵ3) .
Thus, symmetric mechanisms are never optimal if
f (θ∗) θ∗ − F (θ∗) > 0, for all θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ¯), (23)
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or equivalently if F (θ
∗)
f(θ∗)θ∗ < 1. We next show that (23) holds. Define k ≡ 1(θ¯−θ) ln
θ¯
(θ¯−θ) . The
premise df
f
> −k implies that, for all θ ∈ [θ, θ∗], ln f(θ∗)−ln f(θ)
θ∗−θ > −k, or ln f(θ)f(θ∗) < k (θ∗ − θ),
which yields f (θ) < f (θ∗) exp (k (θ∗ − θ)). Thus,
F (θ∗)
f (θ∗) θ∗
<
1
θ∗
∫ θ∗
θ
exp (k (θ∗ − θ)) dθ = exp (k (θ
∗ − θ))− 1
kθ∗
.
By the mean value theorem, there exists a θ∗∗ ∈ [θ, θ∗] such that exp (k (θ∗ − θ)) − 1 =
k exp (k (θ∗∗ − θ)) (θ∗ − θ). Thus,
exp (k (θ∗ − θ))− 1
kθ∗
≤ k exp (k (θ
∗ − θ)) (θ∗ − θ)
kθ∗
= exp (k (θ∗ − θ)) (θ
∗ − θ)
θ∗
≤ exp (k (θ¯ − θ)) (θ¯ − θ)
θ¯
= 1.
Thus, F (θ
∗)
f(θ∗)θ∗ < 1, establishing (23). □
Proof of Proposition 3: We compare mechanism 1 in which θ < θˆ1 ≤ θˆ2 < θ¯, with mecha-
nism 2 where θˆ1 is replaced by θˆ1−ϵ and θˆ2 replaced by θˆ2+ϵ. Expected seller revenues equal
expected social welfare minus expected bidder payoffs. Accordingly, we first calculate the
difference in social welfare gains and then calculate the difference in expected bidder payoffs.
We first calculate the difference in social welfare gains ∆Π∗ = Π∗(θˆ1−ϵ, θˆ2+ϵ)−Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2),
where Π∗ denotes social welfare defined in equation (21). Observe that there is a contribution
to ∆Π∗ only when both θ1 and θ2 lie in [θ, θˆ2 + ϵ], which occurs with probability
(
θˆ2+ϵ−θ
θ¯−θ
)2
.
Consequently, with an abuse of notation, we compute contributions to Π∗(θˆ1− ϵ, θˆ2+ ϵ) and
Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2) only when θ1 and θ2 are in [θ, θˆ2+ ϵ]. Replacing θ¯ with θˆ2+ ϵ in equation (21), we
have for mechanism 1
Π∗
(
θˆ1, θˆ2
)
=
(
θˆ2 + ϵ− θ
θ¯ − θ
)2{(
ϵ
θˆ2 + ϵ− θ
)2(
θˆ2 +
2
3
ϵ
)
+
ϵ
θˆ2 + ϵ− θ
θˆ2 − θ
θˆ2 + ϵ− θ
(
θˆ2 +
1
2
ϵ
)
+
(
1− ϵ
θˆ2 + ϵ− θ
)
θˆ2 − θˆ1 + ϵ
θˆ2 + ϵ− θ
θˆ2 + θˆ1 + ϵ
2
}
− φ
(
2θ¯ − θˆ2 − θˆ1
θ¯ − θ
)
.
The first term inside the braces corresponds to θ2, θ1 ∈ [θˆ2, θˆ2 + ϵ]; the second term corre-
sponds to θ2 ∈ [θˆ2, θˆ2 + ϵ] and θ1 ∈ [θ, θˆ2], and the third term corresponds to θ2 ∈ [θ, θˆ2] and
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θ1 ∈ [θˆ1, θˆ2 + ϵ]. For mechanism 2,
Π∗(θˆ1 − ϵ, θˆ2 + ϵ) =
(
θˆ2 + ϵ− θ
θ¯ − θ
)2{
θˆ2 − θˆ1 + 2ϵ
θˆ2 + ϵ− θ
θˆ2 + θˆ1
2
}
− φ
(
2θ¯ − θˆ2 − θˆ1
θ¯ − θ
)
.
Thus,
∆Π∗ =
(
1
θ¯ − θ
)2{
1
2
(
θˆ2 + ϵ− θ
)(
θˆ2 − θˆ1 + 2ϵ
)(
θˆ2 + θˆ1
)
− ϵ2
(
θˆ2 +
2
3
ϵ
)
− ϵ
(
θˆ2 − θ
)(
θˆ2 +
1
2
ϵ
)
− 1
2
(
θˆ2 − θ
)(
θˆ2 − θˆ1 + ϵ
)(
θˆ2 + θˆ1 + ϵ
)}
=
(
1
θ¯ − θ
)2{
− 2
3
ϵ3 +
(
θˆ1 − θˆ2 + θ
)
ϵ2 +
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
)(
θ − 1
2
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
))
ϵ
}
. (24)
The leading term in (24) is ϵ whose coefficient is (θˆ2− θˆ1)(θ− 12(θˆ2− θˆ1)). As long as θ > 13 θ¯,
which is implied by 2θ > θ¯ + φ, this coefficient is positive, meaning that social welfare Π∗
increases as the gap between the two cutoffs (slightly) widens.
We next calculate bidders’ payoffs in the optimal mechanism with entry cutoffs (θˆ1, θˆ2).
By Lemmas 1 and 2, bidder i with θˆi earns zero, the higher valuation bidder wins if both bid-
ders enter, and a solo entrant wins. Thus, by (8), bidder i’s unconditional expected profit is
pii = (1− α)
∫ θ¯
θˆi
∫ θi
θˆi
Wi (θ) dθdF (θi)
= − (1− α)
∫ θ¯
θˆi
∫ θi
θˆi
Wi (θ) dθd (1− F (θi))
= (1− α)
∫ θ¯
θˆi
(1− F (θi))Wi (θi) dθi.
Because θˆ1 ≤ θˆ2, we have W2 (θ2) = F (θ2) and
W1 (θ1) =
{
F (θ1) if θ1 > θˆ2
F (θˆ2) if θ1 ∈ [θˆ1, θˆ2].
Thus,
pi1 = (1− α)F (θˆ2)
∫ θˆ2
θˆ1
(1− F (θ1)) dθ1 + (1− α)
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
(1− F (θ1))F (θ1) dθ1
pi2 = (1− α)
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
(1− F (θ2))F (θ2) dθ2.
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Letting pi∗(θˆ1, θˆ2) be the sum of both bidders’ equilibrium payoffs,
pi∗(θˆ1, θˆ2) ≡ pi1 + pi2
= (1− α)F
(
θˆ2
)∫ θˆ2
θˆ1
(1− F (θ1)) dθ1 + 2 (1− α)
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
(1− F (θ))F (θ) dθ.
With the uniform distribution, F (θ) = θ−θ
θ¯−θ and 1− F (θ) = θ¯−θθ¯−θ . Thus,(
θ¯ − θ)2
1− α pi
∗(θˆ1, θˆ2) = (θˆ2 − θ)
[
θ¯(θˆ2 − θˆ1)− 1
2
(θˆ22 − θˆ21)
]
+ 2
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
(−θ2 + θ (θ¯ + θ)− θ¯θ) dθ
= (θˆ2 − θ)
[
θ¯(θˆ2 − θˆ1)− 1
2
(θˆ22 − θˆ21)
]
+ 2
[
1
3
θˆ32 −
1
3
θ¯3 +
1
2
(
θ¯ + θ
)
(θ¯2 − θˆ22)− θ¯θ(θ¯ − θˆ2)
]
. (25)
We next calculate ∆pi∗ ≡ pi∗(θˆ1 − ϵ, θˆ2 + ϵ)− pi∗(θˆ1, θˆ2):(
θ¯ − θ)2
1− α ∆pi
∗ = (θˆ2 − θ + ϵ)
[
θ¯(θˆ2 − θˆ1 + 2ϵ)− 1
2
(
(θˆ2 + ϵ)
2 − (θˆ1 − ϵ)2
)]
+ 2
[
1
3
(θˆ2 + ϵ)
3 − 1
3
θ¯3 +
1
2
(
θ¯ + θ
) (
θ¯2 − (θˆ2 + ϵ)2
)
− θ¯θ(θ¯ − θˆ2 − ϵ)
]
− (θˆ2 − θ)
[
θ¯(θˆ2 − θˆ1)− 1
2
(θˆ22 − θˆ21)
]
− 2
[
1
3
θˆ32 −
1
3
θ¯3 +
1
2
(
θ¯ + θ
)
(θ¯2 − θˆ22)− θ¯θ(θ¯ − θˆ2)
]
. (26)
On the right-hand side of (26), the terms proportional to ϵ sum up to[(
θ¯(θˆ2 − θˆ1)− 1
2
θˆ22 +
1
2
θˆ21
)
+ (θˆ2 − θ)
(
2θ¯ − θˆ2 − θˆ1
)
+ 2
(
θˆ22 −
(
θ¯ + θ
)
θˆ2 + θ¯θ
)]
ϵ
= (θˆ2 − θˆ1)
(
θ¯ − θ + 1
2
(θˆ2 − θˆ1)
)
ϵ,
and the terms proportional to ϵ2 sum up to[
2θ¯ − θˆ2 − θˆ1 + 2θˆ2 −
(
θ¯ + θ
)]
ϵ2 = (θ¯ − θ + θˆ2 − θˆ1)ϵ2.
Including all terms yields(
θ¯ − θ)2
1− α ∆pi
∗ = (θˆ2 − θˆ1)
(
θ¯ − θ + 1
2
(θˆ2 − θˆ1)
)
ϵ+ (θ¯ − θ + θˆ2 − θˆ1)ϵ2 + 2
3
ϵ3.
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Because the right-hand side of the above is strictly positive for ϵ > 0, and 1 − α > 0, we
have ∆pi∗ > 0, implying that spreading the cutoffs raises bidders’ payoffs.
Together with ∆Π∗ in (24), we have
(
θ¯ − θ)2 (∆Π∗ −∆pi∗) = −2
3
ϵ3 +
(
θˆ1 − θˆ2 + θ
)
ϵ2 +
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
)(
θ − 1
2
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
))
ϵ
− (1− α)
{
(θˆ2 − θˆ1)
(
θ¯ − θ + 1
2
(θˆ2 − θˆ1)
)
ϵ+ (θ¯ − θ + θˆ2 − θˆ1)ϵ2 + 2
3
ϵ3
}
=
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
)[
2θ − θ¯ −
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
)
+ α
(
θ¯ − θ + 1
2
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
))]
ϵ
+
[
(2− α)
(
θ − θˆ2 + θˆ1
)
− (1− α) θ¯
]
ϵ2 + o
(
ϵ3
)
, (27)
which is positive for small ϵ at θˆ2 = θˆ1, for all α ≥ 0, given the assumption that 2θ > θ¯.
∆Π∗ −∆pi∗ represents the increase in the seller’s profit associated with adopting the more
asymmetric mechanism, implying that interior symmetric cutoffs cannot be optimal.
Next, it follows from (21) and (25) that
(
θ¯ − θ)2 ∂
∂θˆ2
(
Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)− pi∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)
) ∣∣∣∣
θˆ1=θ
= −
(
1
2
θ¯2 − θˆ2θ + 1
2
θˆ22
)
+
1
2
θ¯2 − 1
2
θ2 +
(
θ¯ − θ)φ
− (1− α)
{
(θˆ2 − θ)
[
θ¯ − 1
2
(θˆ2 + θ)
]
+ (θˆ2 − θ)(θ¯ − θˆ2) + 2θˆ22 − 2
(
θ¯ + θ
)
θˆ2 + 2θ¯θ
}
= −1
2
(2− α)(θˆ2 − θ)2 +
(
θ¯ − θ)φ. (28)
The right-hand side of (28) is strictly positive at θˆ2 = θ, implying that θˆ2 = θˆ1 = θ cannot
be optimal, and it is immediate that θˆ2 = θˆ1 = θ¯ cannot be optimal. Thus, no symmetric
mechanism is optimal.
Next, to show that always excluding a bidder is not optimal, suppose by way of contra-
diction that it is. Then under 2θ − θ¯ > φ, setting θˆ1 = θ is optimal (given the premise that
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bidder 1 is the sole entrant). Differentiating (25) at (θˆ1 = θ, θˆ2 = θ¯) with respect to θˆ2 yields
(θ¯ − θ)2
1− α
∂pi∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)
∂θˆ2
∣∣∣∣
θˆ1 = θ, θˆ2=θ¯
= θ¯(θ¯ − θ)− 1
2
(θ¯2 − θ2) + (θ¯ − θ)θ¯ − θ¯(θ¯ − θ)
+ 2(θ¯2 − θ¯(θ¯ + θ) + θ¯θ)
=
(θ¯ − θ)2
2
> 0.
Moreover, by (22), ∂Π
∗(θˆ1,θˆ2)
∂θˆ2
∣∣∣∣
θˆ1=θ, θˆ2=θ¯
< 0, implying that
∂
∂θˆ2
(
Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)− pi∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)
) ∣∣∣∣
θˆ1=θ, θˆ2=θ¯
< 0.
Thus, always excluding one bidder is not optimal; that is, θˆ2 ̸= θ¯. This completes the proof
of part (i) of the proposition.
Because symmetric cutoffs are not optimal, assume that θˆ2 > θˆ1. To establish when
θˆ1 = θ is optimal, observe that the leading term in (27) is ϵ, which has coefficient(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
)[
2θ − θ¯ −
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
)
+ α
(
θ¯ − θ + 1
2
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
))]
≥
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
)[
2θ − θ¯ − (θ¯ − θ)+ α(θ¯ − θ + 1
2
(
θ¯ − θ))]
=
(
θˆ2 − θˆ1
)[
3θ − 2θ¯ + 3
2
α
(
θ¯ − θ)] .
This leading coefficient is positive (meaning that it is optimal to spread entry cutoffs until
either θˆ1 = θ or θˆ2 = θ¯) if and only if α >
2(2θ¯−3θ)
3(θ¯−θ) . But, because θˆ2 ̸= θ¯, we must have θˆ1 = θ.
Then, setting the right-hand side of the first-order condition (28) for θˆ2 to zero yields
θˆ2 = θ +
√
2φ
(
θ¯ − θ)
2− α < θ +
√
2φ
(
θ¯ − θ) < θ¯,
where the last inequality holds by θ¯− θ > 2φ. Therefore, the optimal cutoffs are θˆ1 = θ and
θˆ2 ∈ (θ, θ¯), establishing part (ii) of the proposition. □
Proof of Proposition 4: We incorporate the cost of implementing asymmetric mecha-
nisms to the two mechanisms considered in the proof of Proposition 3 (where in mechanism
2, θˆ1 is replaced by θˆ1 − ϵ and θˆ2 replaced by θˆ2 + ϵ). The difference of this cost in the two
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mechanisms is γ(θˆ2 − θˆ1 + 2ϵ)2 − γ(θˆ2 − θˆ1)2 = 4γ[(θˆ2 − θˆ1)ϵ + ϵ2]. Subtracting this cost
(multiplied by (θ¯ − θ)2) from the right-hand side of (27) yields that
(θ¯ − θ)2(∆Π∗ −∆pi∗) = (θˆ2 − θˆ1)
[
2θ − θ¯ − (θˆ2 − θˆ1) + α(θ¯ − θ + 1
2
(θˆ2 − θˆ1))− 4(θ¯ − θ)2γ
]
ϵ
+ [(2− α)(θ − θˆ2 + θˆ1)− (1− α)θ¯ − 4(θ¯ − θ)2γ]ϵ2 + o(ϵ3), (29)
where ∆Π∗ − ∆pi∗ is the increase in the seller’s profit from adopting the more asymmet-
ric mechanism derived in the proof of Proposition 3. For any symmetric mechanism with
θˆ2 = θˆ1 ∈
(
θ, θ¯
)
, the right-hand side of (29) reduces to
[2θ − θ¯ + α(θ¯ − θ)− 4(θ¯ − θ)2γ]ϵ2 + o (ϵ3) .
If γ < γ∗ (α), this expression is strictly positive. Furthermore, θˆ2 = θˆ1 = θ or θˆ2 = θˆ1 = θ¯ is
not optimal. Thus, symmetric mechanisms are not optimal.
To show that when γ ≥ γ∗ (α), symmetric mechanisms are optimal, suppose instead that
the optimal mechanism features θˆ2 > θˆ1. The leading term on the right-hand side of (29) is
(θˆ2 − θˆ1)
(
2θ − θ¯ − (θˆ2 − θˆ1) + α(θ¯ − θ + 1
2
(θˆ2 − θˆ1))− 4(θ¯ − θ)2γ
)
ϵ
≤ (θˆ2 − θˆ1)
(
2θ − θ¯ − (θˆ2 − θˆ1) + α(θ¯ − θ + 1
2
(θˆ2 − θˆ1))− 4(θ¯ − θ)2γ∗ (α)
)
ϵ
< (θˆ2 − θˆ1)
(
2θ − θ¯ + α(θ¯ − θ)− 4(θ¯ − θ)2γ∗ (α)) ϵ
= (θˆ2 − θˆ1)
(
2θ − θ¯ + α(θ¯ − θ)− (2θ − θ¯ + (θ¯ − θ)α)) ϵ = 0.
This implies that the seller would strictly benefit by slightly closing the gaps between θˆ2 and
θˆ1 (i.e., ϵ < 0). Thus, θˆ2 > θˆ1 cannot be optimal, implying that symmetric mechanisms are
optimal if γ ≥ γ∗ (α). □
Proof of Proposition 5: By (11), in any optimal mechanism with entry cutoffs (θˆ1, θˆ2),
the seller’s revenue is
Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2) =
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
∫ θ¯
θˆ1
max {ξ(θ1), ξ(θ2)} dF (θ1) dF (θ2)
+ F (θˆ2)
∫ θ¯
θˆ1
ξ(θ1)dF (θ1) + F (θˆ1)
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
ξ(θ2)dF (θ2)−
∑
i
φi(1− F (θˆi)).
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We first show that inducing θˆ1 > θˆ2 cannot be optimal. Suppose it is. All terms in the
seller’s revenue save for the last one are symmetric in θˆ1 and θˆ2. Therefore, interchanging θˆ1
and θˆ2 would increase the seller’s revenue because φ2 > φ1. It follows that θˆ1 ≤ θˆ2.
For θˆ1 ≤ θˆ2, the seller’s revenue can be rewritten as
Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2) =
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
(∫ θ2
θˆ1
ξ(θ2)dF (θ1) +
∫ θ¯
θ2
ξ(θ1)dF (θ1)
)
dF (θ2)
+ F (θˆ2)
∫ θ¯
θˆ1
ξ(θ1)dF (θ1) + F (θˆ1)
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
ξ(θ2)dF (θ2)−
∑
i
φi(1− F (θˆi)).
Suppose θˆ2 = θ¯. Then, because 2θ − θ¯ > φ1 implies ξ(θ) > φ1, θˆ1 = θ is optimal. However,
∂Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)
∂θˆ2
∣∣∣∣
θˆ1=θ, θˆ2=θ¯
= f(θ¯)
(∫ θ¯
θ
(ξ(θ1)− ξ(θ¯))dF (θ1) + φ2
)
= f(θ¯)
(∫ θ¯
θ
((2− α)θ1 − (2− α)θ¯)dF (θ1) + φ2
)
= f(θ¯)
(
−(2− α) θ¯ − θ
2
+ φ2
)
< f(θ¯)
(
− θ¯ − θ
2
+ φ2
)
< 0,
where the last inequality holds by θ¯−θ
2
> φ2. Thus, θˆ2 < θ¯.
Next consider any symmetric entry cutoff θˆ′ = θˆ1 = θˆ2 ∈ (θ, θ¯). Then,(
∂Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)
∂θˆ2
− ∂Π
∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)
∂θˆ1
)∣∣∣∣
θˆ′=θˆ1=θˆ2
= −f(θˆ′)
∫ θ¯
θˆ′
ξ(θ)dF (θ) + f(θˆ′)
∫ θ¯
θˆ′
ξ(θ)dF (θ)− F (θˆ′)ξ(θˆ′)f(θˆ′) + f(θˆ′)
∫ θ¯
θˆ′
ξ(θ)dF (θ)
+ F (θˆ′)ξ(θˆ′)f(θˆ′)− f(θˆ′)
∫ θ¯
θˆ′
ξ(θ)dF (θ) + (φ2 − φ1)f(θˆ′)
= (φ2 − φ1)f(θˆ′) > 0.
The last equality holds by the full-support assumption and φ2 > φ1: reducing θˆ1 and in-
creasing θˆ2 marginally from any symmetric cutoff θˆ
′ ∈ (θ, θ¯) increase seller revenues. Thus,
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θˆ1 = θˆ2 ∈ (θ, θ¯) cannot be optimal. Moreover,
∂Π∗(θˆ1, θˆ2)
∂θˆ2
∣∣∣∣
θˆ1=θˆ2=θ
= φ2f(θ) > 0
implies that θˆ1 = θˆ2 = θ is not optimal. Therefore, we must have θˆ1 < θˆ2 < θ¯. □
Proof of Proposition 6: Let (θˆ1, θˆ2) be entry cutoffs. Let Π(θˆ1, p) be the seller’s expected
revenue in the optimal mechanism, where p ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that bidder 2 enters.
With uniformly-distributed valuations, the virtual valuation of bidder i ∈ {1, 2} is given
by (17). Thus limθ¯2→θ ξ2(θ2) = θ for all θ2. Let θ˜ be the value of θ1 such that ξ1(θ1) = θ:
θ˜ =
θ + (1− α) θ¯1
2− α .
To calculate Π(θˆ1, p), there are two cases to consider:
Case 1: θˆ1 ≥ θ˜. Noting that with θ¯2 → θ, the (very) weak bidder 2 wins only when strong
bidder 1 does not enter and bidder 2 enters (which occurs with probability p), (11) yields that
Π(θˆ1 ≥ θ˜, p) =
∫ θ¯1
θˆ1
ξ1(θ1)dF1(θ1) + F1(θˆ1)pθ −
(
(1− F1(θˆ1)) + p
)
φ
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
((α
2
− 1
)
θˆ21 + (1− α) θ¯1θˆ1 +
α
2
θ¯21 + (θˆ1 − θ)pθ − (θ¯1 − θˆ1 + p(θ¯1 − θ))φ
)
.
(30)
The first term is the contribution to Π when θ1 ∈ [θˆ1, θ¯1], the second term is when θ1 ∈ [θ, θˆ1).
Case 2: θˆ1 < θ˜. Then, with θ¯2 → θ, bidder 1 always wins when θ1 ∈ [θ˜, θ¯1]; while bidder 2
wins if it enters (with probability p) and θ1 ∈ [θˆ1, θ˜). Thus, (11) yields
Π(θˆ1 < θ˜, p) =
∫ θ¯1
θ˜
ξ1(θ1)dF1(θ1) +
∫ θ˜
θˆ1
(pθ + (1− p) ξ1(θ1)) dF1(θ1)
+ F1(θˆ1)pθ −
(
(1− F1(θˆ1)) + p
)
φ
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
((α
2
− 1
)
θ˜2 + (1− α) θ¯1θ˜ + α
2
θ¯21
)
+
1
θ¯1 − θ
[
pθ(θ˜ − θˆ1) + (1− p)(θ˜ − θˆ1)
((
1− α
2
)
(θˆ1 + θ˜)− (1− α) θ¯1
)]
+
θˆ1 − θ
θ¯1 − θ
pθ −
(
θ¯1 − θˆ1
θ¯1 − θ
+ p
)
φ,
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where the first term is the contribution to Π when θ1 ∈ [θ˜, θ¯1], the second term is when
θ1 ∈ [θˆ1, θ˜), and the third term is when θ1 ∈ [θ, θˆ1).
The optimal choices of θˆ1 and p maximize expected seller revenue:
(θˆ∗1, p
∗) ∈ arg max
θˆ1∈[θ,θ¯1], p∈[0,1]
Π(θˆ1, p).
We denote the maximum value of Π by Π∗ ≡ Π(θˆ∗1, p∗) .
Lemma 4 Let Π∗p=0 ≡ maxθˆ1∈[θ,θ¯1]Π(θˆ1, p = 0) and Π∗p=1 ≡ maxθˆ1∈[θ,θ¯1]Π(θˆ1, p = 1). Then,
(i) Π∗ = max
{
Π∗p=0,Π
∗
p=1
}
, and
(ii) If Π∗p=0 > Π
∗
p=1, then p
∗ = 0 in all solutions; if Π∗p=0 < Π
∗
p=1, then p
∗ = 1 in all
solutions; and if Π∗p=0 = Π
∗
p=1, then solutions feature different p
∗, and there exists at least
one solution for each p∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: Although the form of Π(θˆ1, p) is complicated, it has the simple feature that Π(θˆ1, p) is
affine in p. In particular, regardless of whether θˆ1 ≥ θ˜ or θˆ1 < θ˜, ∂Π(θˆ1,p)∂p is independent of p:
∂Π(θˆ1 ≥ θ˜, p)
∂p
=
θˆ1 − θ
θ¯1 − θ
θ − φ;
∂Π(θˆ1 < θ˜, p)
∂p
=
θ˜ − θˆ1
θ¯1 − θ
(
θ −
(
1− α
2
)(
θˆ1 + θ˜
)
+ (1− α) θ¯1
)
+
θˆ1 − θ
θ¯1 − θ
θ − φ.
Utilizing this feature, we consider the value of
∂Π(θˆ∗1 ,p
∗)
∂p
, where (θˆ∗1, p
∗) is a solution that
maximizes Π(θˆ1, p). There can be only three cases:
1. If
∂Π(θˆ∗1 ,p)
∂p
< 0, then p∗ = 0. To see this, suppose to the contrary that p∗ > 0. Then
Π(θˆ∗1, p = 0) > Π(θˆ
∗
1, p
∗), contradicting the premise that (θˆ∗1, p
∗) is a solution for opti-
mality. Thus p∗ = 0. Furthermore, it follows that Π∗p=0 > Π
∗
p=1.
2. If
∂Π(θˆ∗1 ,p
∗)
∂p
> 0, then by same logic, we have p∗ = 1 and Π∗p=0 < Π
∗
p=1.
3. If
∂Π(θˆ∗1 ,p
∗)
∂p
= 0, then for any p ∈ [0, 1], (θˆ∗1, p) is also optimal. □
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We now use this lemma to solve for all (θˆ∗1, p
∗). We have
∂Π(θˆ1 ≥ θ˜, p)
∂θˆ1
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
(
(α− 2)θˆ1 + (1− α)θ¯1 + pθ + φ
)
; (31)
∂Π(θˆ1 < θ˜, p)
∂θˆ1
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
[
(1− p)
(
(α− 2)θˆ1 + (1− α)θ¯1
)
+ φ
]
. (32)
(Step 1): We first calculate Π∗p=0. We show
Π∗p=0 =
{
θ + α
2
(
θ¯1 − θ
)− φ if φ ≤ ξ1(θ) = (2− α) θ − (1− α) θ¯1
1
4−2α
(θ¯1−φ)2
θ¯1−θ if φ > (2− α) θ − (1− α) θ¯1.
(33)
To establish (33), noting that conditional on p = 0, bidder 1 is the only potential bidder, it
follows from (11) that Π(θˆ1, p = 0) is maximized by (19), where the θˆ1 in the second line of
(19) solves the first-order condition ξ1(θˆ1) = φ. By (11) and (17),
Π(θˆ1, p = 0) =
1
θ¯1 − θ
[(
1− α
2
)((
θ¯1
)2 − (θˆ1)2)− (1− α) θ¯1 (θ¯1 − θˆ1)]− θ¯1 − θˆ1
θ¯1 − θ
φ
=
θ¯1 − θˆ1
θ¯1 − θ
[(
1− α
2
)(
θ¯1 + θˆ1
)
− (1− α) θ¯1 − φ
]
=
θ¯1 − θˆ1
θ¯1 − θ
[α
2
θ¯1 +
(
1− α
2
)
θˆ1 − φ
]
. (34)
If φ ≤ (2− α) θ− (1− α) θ¯1, then, plugging the first line of (19) (θˆ1 = θ) into (34) estab-
lishes the first line of (33). If, instead, φ ∈ (ξ1(θ), θ¯1), then plugging the second line of (19)
into (34) yields
Π∗p=0 =
θ¯1 − θˆ1
θ¯1 − θ
[
α
2
θ¯1 +
(
1− α
2
) (1− α) θ¯1 + φ
(2− α) − φ
]
=
θ¯1 − θˆ1
θ¯1 − θ
[
α
2
θ¯1 +
(1− α) θ¯1 + φ
2
− φ
]
=
θ¯1 − θˆ1
θ¯1 − θ
[
1
2
θ¯1 − 1
2
φ
]
=
(
θ¯1 − φ
)
θ¯1 − θ
1
2− α
[
1
2
θ¯1 − 1
2
φ
]
,
which establishes the second line of (33).
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(Step 2): We next calculate Π∗p=1. We show
Π∗p=1 =
{
θ − φ if φ ≥ θ¯1 − θ
Πˆ if φ < θ¯1 − θ, (35)
where
Πˆ ≡ 1
θ¯1 − θ
×
{(
(1− α) θ¯1 + θ + φ
)2
2 (2− α) +
α
2
θ¯21 − θ2 − 2θ¯1φ+ θφ
}
. (36)
To establish (35), note that (32) yields
∂Π(θˆ1 < θ˜, p = 1)
∂θˆ1
=
φ
θ¯1 − θ
> 0,
by which we have Π∗p=1 = maxθˆ1∈[θ,θ¯1]Π(θˆ1, p = 1) = maxθˆ1≥θ˜ Π(θˆ1, p = 1). Then (31) yields
∂Π(θˆ1 ≥ θ˜, p = 1)
∂θˆ1
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
(
(α− 2)θˆ1 + (1− α)θ¯1 + θ + φ
)
,
which is decreasing in θˆ1. Moreover, evaluating it both at θ˜ and θ¯1 yields that
∂Π(θˆ1 = θ˜, p = 1)
∂θˆ1
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
(
(α− 2)θ˜ + (1− α)θ¯1 + θ + φ
)
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
(
−ξ1(θ˜) + θ + φ
)
=
φ
θ¯1 − θ
> 0;
∂Π(θˆ1 = θ¯1, p = 1)
∂θˆ1
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
(−θ¯1 + θ + φ) .
Thus, ∂Π(θˆ1=θ¯1,p=1)
∂θˆ1
≥ 0 if and only if φ ≥ θ¯1−θ. Hence, if φ ≥ θ¯1−θ, then θˆ1 = θ¯1 maximizes
Π(θˆ1, p = 1); evaluating (30) at θˆ1 = θ¯1 and p = 1 yields the first line of (35).
Now consider φ < θ¯1 − θ. Because ∂Π(θˆ1≥θ˜,p=1)∂θˆ1 declines with θˆ1, the first-order condition
∂Π(θˆ1≥θ˜,p=1)
∂θˆ1
= 0 is necessary and sufficient for maximization. Plugging the solution for the
first-order condition, (18), and p = 1 into (30) yields
Π∗p=1 =
1
θ¯1 − θ
×
{(α
2
− 1
)((1− α)θ¯1 + θ + φ
2− α
)2
+ (1− α) θ¯1 (1− α)θ¯1 + θ + φ
2− α
+
α
2
θ¯21 +
(
(1− α)θ¯1 + θ + φ
2− α − θ
)
θ −
(
2θ¯1 − (1− α)θ¯1 + θ + φ
2− α − θ
)
φ
}
,
yielding the second line of (35).
Finally, consider the difference Π∗p=0 − Π∗p=1. Optimality of Π∗p=0 yields Π∗p=0 ≥ Π(θˆ1 =
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θ, p = 0) = θ + α
2
(
θ¯1 − θ
) − φ for all φ. By (35), Π∗p=1 = θ − φ if φ ≥ θ¯1 − θ. Thus,
Π∗p=0 ≥ Π∗p=1 if φ ≥ θ¯1 − θ, and strict inequality holds if α > 0.
Under φ < θ¯1 − θ, we first show Π∗p=0 < Π∗p=1 when φ approaches 0. By (33) and (35),
Π∗p=1 − Π∗p=0 =
1
θ¯1 − θ
×
{(
(1− α) θ¯1 + θ
)2
2 (2− α) +
α
2
θ¯21 − θ2
}
− θ − α
2
(
θ¯1 − θ
)
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
×
{(
(1− α)θ¯1 + θ
)2
2(2− α) −
(
(1− α)θ¯1 + α
2
θ
)
θ
}
=
1
(θ¯1 − θ)2(2− α)
×
{(
(1− α)θ¯1 + θ
)2 − 2(2− α)((1− α)θ¯1 + α
2
θ
)
θ
}
=
1
(θ¯1 − θ)2(2− α)
×
{
(1− α)2θ¯21 − 2(1− α)2θ¯1θ + (1− α)2θ2
}
=
(1− α)2(θ¯1 − θ)
2(2− α) > 0.
Moreover, differentiating (33) with respect to φ yields
∂Π∗p=0
∂φ
{
= −1 if φ ≤ (2− α) θ − (1− α) θ¯1
≥ −1 if φ > (2− α) θ − (1− α) θ¯1,
and, for φ ∈ (0, θ¯1 − θ), differentiating the second line of (35) with respect to φ yields
∂Π∗p=1
∂φ
= −1 + φ− (θ¯1 − θ)
(2− α)(θ¯1 − θ)
< −1.
Hence, Π∗p=0 − Π∗p=1 strictly increases in φ for φ ∈ (0, θ¯1 − θ). When α > 0, because (1)
Π∗p=0 − Π∗p=1 < 0 when φ approaches zero, (2) Π∗p=0 − Π∗p=1 > 0 when φ ≥ θ¯1 − θ, and (3)
Π∗p=0−Π∗p=1 is continuous in φ (see (33) and (35)), there exists a unique φ∗(α) < θ¯1− θ such
that Π∗p=0 − Π∗p=1 = 0, or
Π∗p=0 (α, φ
∗)− Πˆ (α, φ∗) = 0, (37)
where Πˆ is given by (36). This φ∗(α) has the property that Π∗p=0 < Π
∗
p=1 for all φ < φ
∗(α)
and Π∗p=0 > Π
∗
p=1 for all φ ∈
(
φ∗(α), θ¯1
)
.
To determine the sign of dφ
∗(α)
dα
, we apply the implicit function theorem to (37) to obtain
dφ∗(α)
dα
= −
d(Π∗p=0−Πˆ)
dα
d(Π∗p=0−Πˆ)
dφ∗(α)
.
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By (36), we have
d
dα
Πˆ ≡ 1
θ¯1 − θ
×
{
− θ¯1
(
(1− α) θ¯1 + θ + φ
)
2− α +
(
(1− α) θ¯1 + θ + φ
)2
2 (2− α)2 +
1
2
θ¯21
}
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
1
2 (2− α)2
{(
(1− α) θ¯1 + θ + φ
)2 − θ¯1 ((1− α) θ¯1 + θ + φ) 2 (2− α) + (2− α)2 θ¯21}
=
1
θ¯1 − θ
(
θ¯1 − θ − φ
)2
2 (2− α)2 ,
and by (33) we have
d
dα
Π∗p=0 =
{ 1
2
(
θ¯1 − θ
)
if φ ≤ (2− α) θ − (1− α) θ¯1
1
2(2−α)2
(θ¯1−φ)2
θ¯1−θ if φ > (2− α) θ − (1− α) θ¯1.
Noting that 2 − α > 1 and θ¯1 − θ − φ < θ¯1 − θ, we readily have d(Π
∗
p=0−Πˆ)
dα
> 0. Because
d(Π∗p=0−Πˆ)
dφ∗(α) > 0 for φ
∗(α) < θ¯1 − θ, we have dφ∗(α)dα < 0.
Finally, note that limφ→φ∗(α)− θˆ1 is given by (18) evaluated at φ = φ∗(α), and limφ→φ∗(α)+ θˆ1
is given by (19) evaluated at φ = φ∗(α). Thus, limφ→φ∗(α)− θˆ1 > limφ→φ∗(α)+ θˆ1. Furthermore,
θˆ1 in (19) weakly increases in φ. This completes the proof. □
Unknown Valuations. Suppose that bidders do not know their valuations before making
entry decisions. Then, if m potential bidders enter, defining Qm(θ
1) to be the distribution
over the highest valuation, a seller’s expected payoff cannot exceed
Π¯m ≡
∫ θ¯
θ
θ1dQm
(
θ1
)−mφ.
This reflects that social welfare cannot exceed
∫ θ¯
θ
θ1dQm (θ
1), and expected bidder payoffs
(net of entry costs) must be nonnegative. Thus, an upper bound on a seller’s expected payoff
is Π¯m∗ , where m
∗ = argmaxm≤n Π¯m. It follows that m∗ ≥ 1 when φ < θ. We now show that
Π¯m∗ is attainable simply by using lump-sum transfers (the same fee for each bidder, where
a negative entry fee corresponds to a cash reimbursement):
Proposition 7 Π¯m∗ is implementable in the pure-strategy equilibrium of any standard for-
mat in which bidders bid with a fixed royalty rate α ∈ [0, 1) plus cash, face a reserve that does
not exceed the break-even bid of a bidder with valuation θ, and pay an entry fee of pi∗−φ, where
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pi∗ is the expected payoff of an entering bidder (excluding entry costs) given m∗ entrants.
Proof : We show that m∗ potential bidders’ entering constitutes an equilibrium. Any en-
tering bidder receives expected payoff (gross of entry cost) of φ. Thus, entering is a best
response. Further, if n > m∗, then each potential bidder who did not enter strictly prefers
not to enter: the expected payoff (gross of entry cost) from entry would be strictly less than
φ due to the heightened competition, making entering unprofitable. Thus, the equilibrium
holds. In equilibrium, each bidder’s ex-ante expected payoff (including entry costs) is zero,
and social welfare is maximized for the given m∗ entrants, establishing the proposition. □
One way to implement this mechanism is to use α = 0, i.e., pure cash auctions (hence, no
tying) and an entry fee.18 By contrast, if bidders know their valuations before entry, potential
bidders have an informational advantage that a seller must offset by tying payments to their
private information, as in Lemmas 1 and 2. Further, with unknown-valuations, efficiency is
not impaired by having no trade—a seller always awards the asset, as the profit equals the
welfare gain from trade. In contrast, with known valuations, a seller raises entry thresholds,
screening out low-valuation bidders.
When bidders do not know their valuations prior to making entry decisions, two types of
equilibria exist: a pure strategy equilibrium (McAfee and McMillan, 1987) in which entrants
expect non-negative profits, but with greater entry, expected profits would become nega-
tive; and a mixed strategy equilibrium (Levin and Smith, 1994) in which potential bidders
enter with a common probability p. The equilibrium in Proposition 7 delivers the optimal
number of entrants: full surplus extraction is obtained via the pure-strategy equilibrium,
as in McAfee and McMillan (1987), in which the right (deterministic) number of bidders
endogenously choose to enter, making it unnecessary to restrict entry.
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